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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
David R. Daines, Trustee of 
the VERNA R. DAINES TRUST, 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
Appellate Case No. 20100997-CA 
vs. 
LOGAN CITY, a Utah Municipal 
Corporation, and John and Jane Does 
One to Fifty, 
Defendant/ Appellee 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
REPLY SUMMARY 
The most notable feature of the Brief of the Appellee ("City Br.'5) is the 
conspicuous absence of arguments countering the Trust briefs major points, authorities 
and arguments that show a broad and systemic pattern of disregard of the rule of 
constitutional law in City governance. The Trust submits that the failure of the City to 
counter those arguments is a concession of their validity, especially where the City had 
ten unused brief pages on which to counter those arguments and failed to do so. 
The City's summary of its argument and argument ignore the Trust briefs broad 
unchallenged civil rights points, and narrows and defines the scope of its response: 
Daines appeal depends primarily on varied assertions that his 
nonconforming use claim should have been decided by a Hearing Examiner under 
the City's Administrative Enforcement Code, and because the City instead 
1 
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directed his appeal to the Board, that body's decision was arbitrary, capricious and 
illegal and violated Dames' constitutional rights. 
This apparently major component of Daines' appeal fails quite simply 
because by its own plain terms the Administrative Enforcement Code is 
permissive, rather than mandatory, enforcement mechanism. No City ordinance 
appoints a Hearing Examiner as an appeal authority over any land use decision, 
but city ordinances do unambiguously appoint the Board as the authority to which 
an appeal of a nonconforming use decision must be made. Indeed, there is no 
"violation" of City ordinances a Hearing Examiner could address until after the 
Board makes a final decision on a responsible person's claim of a nonconforming 
use. City Br. p 20. 
The Trust will show that this City interpretation of the relevant ordinances is 
without merit, that the AE Code scope clause use of "may" rather than "shall" does not 
permit the City to choose whether it will opt out of the AE Code or direct appeals from 
decisions to the Board or Hearing Examiner. An interpretation of the AE Code that the 
Board had sole or "permissive" appellate authority would be an unconstitutional 
interpretation and violate MLUDMA. The AE Code-Land Development Code 
"ordinance" appoints the Hearing Examiner as the appeal authority over all City non-
legislative administrative decisions and pre-empts the Board's previous appellate 
authority over those decisions. The assertion that nonconforming use right claims are 
subject to onerous double appeal processes that do not apply to other similar rights is 
disingenuous. 
The City summarizes its next argument as follows: 
To the extent that they are cognizable, Daines' secondary arguments similarly fail. 
The Board enacted the bylaws and rules required by ordinance prior to hearing or 
deciding Daines' appeal, and Daines does not demonstrate the bylaws were non-
compliant in any way. The Board and district court review provided Daines with 
ample procedural due process, and the Board's decision is well supported by 
evidence in the record and a rational basis, and so is not arbitrary or capricious in 
any way. City Br. pp 20-21. 
2 
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In reply, the Trust will show not only that the de facto Board acted beyond its 
jurisdiction but also acted without authority because it failed to adopt the ordinance 
required rules of procedure for a quasi-judicial body, that the invalid Robert's Rules of 
legislative order adopted after a decade of unauthorized ad hoc ultra vires actions were a 
pretext to continue its future ultra vires operation; and did not, could not and were not 
intended by the Board to apply to the Trust appeal. The de facto Board ignored the due 
process rules in the AE Code on the pretext that legislative rules provided due process. 
There is no merit to the City's claim that the de facto Board or district court provided 
required procedural due process and the de facto Board's actions were per se arbitrary 
and capricious. 
The City asserts in the conclusion to its summary of arguments: 
Daines' remaining vaguely defined claims that an administrative search violated 
the Fourth Amendment and the City's Landlord Licensing ordinance is 
unconstitutional, were not plead in the operative complaint nor presented to the 
district court. This Court should not now address them on appeal. City Br. p 21. 
Conspicuously absent from the City's brief is its failure to respond to the Trust's 
primary claim that the administrative search violated the AE Code requirement that there 
must be consent or an administrative warrant and was therefore per se arbitrary, thus ' 
violating due process. The concurrent Fourth Amendment connection is obvious and 
intertwined with the due process implications. The consideration of the dual legal 
consequences flowing from the same facts is essential to a proper judicial resolution of 
the issues. 
( 
3 
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The reason the City's Landlord Licensing ordinance was not and could not have 
been plead in the operative complaint nor presented in the district court is that it did not 
take effect until July 1, 2010 after all the summary judgment pleadings were complete. 
The Trust would have been remiss in its duty to the court in this appeal to have failed to 
add this issue in the same sense that there is a due diligence duty to research and bring to 
the attention of the court later cases that bear on the issues on appeal. 
The last two paragraphs of the City Brief respond to the Trust claim that the City's 
Landlord Licensing ordinance is unconstitutional: 
Although the basis for Daines' challenge to the City's Landlord Licensing 
Ordinance are also unclear, he does describe the ordinance as a "Provo style 
landlord licensing ordinance." Aplt's. Br. p. 46. In Anderson v. Provo City. 2005 
UT 5, the Utah Supreme Court denied a challenge to Provo City's Landlord 
Licensing Ordinance and held that the Provo ordinance and associated 
amendments "constitute land use regulations within the zoning power of the Provo 
City Municipal Council. Anderson 2005 UT 5, ^ J 16. The Court went on to hold 
that the Ordinance "does not violate owners, constitutional rights to the uniform 
operation of laws, to equal protection, or to travel, and is not an invalid restraint on 
alienation." Id TI 29. 
Except for opprobrious characterizations of the policy underlying the ordinance, 
Daines fails to allege or prove the ordinance has ever been applied to him. Aplt's. 
Br. pp. 46-48. In light of Anderson v. Provo, and absent any citation to authority 
or analysis, Daines' challenge to the City's Landlord Licensing Ordinance fails 
even if the Court were inclined to address it. City Br. p 39 
The Trust will show that: (1) Anderson has nothing to do with Provo's Landlord 
Licensing ordinance; (2) it was the City not the Trustee who in 2006 described a future 
"Provo style landlord licensing ordinance" as an additional means of enforcing Logan's 
nonconforming rights termination policy; (3) an analysis of the differences between the 
4 
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Provo pattern and the Logan ordinance identifies many of the unconstitutional effects of 
the Logan ordinance not present in the Provo pattern. 
An analysis of 2005 Anderson shows (1) it deals exclusively with an amendment 
to a zoning ordinance not the landlord licensing ordinance; (2) that the "return to single 
family character of neighborhoods" justification terminology for Logan's 2006 policy 
terminating legal non conforming rights was borrowed directly from and is inapposite to 
the Anderson opinion and holding; (3) the Anderson opinion supports the Trust argument 
that (a) the licensing ordinance provision that exempts owners who occupy one of the 
multi-family units from licensing and forced grandfathering, denies equal protection to 
the class of non occupying owners, (b) that the general policy of terminating legal 
nonconforming rights denies equal protection to the class of non conforming rights as 
distinct from other similar property rights protected by zoning laws. 
All of the City's arguments are without merit, basically contradictory and often in 
denial of uncontested facts and law presented in the Trust brief that the City elected not to 
challenge. One example: The City argues that the Board is a "permissive" alternative to 
the Hearing Examiner as a quasi-judicial appeal body from administrative decisions 
because it is so designated in the table, LDC § 17.57.030. City Br. p 26, Table p 13. This 
assumes that the Board's quasi-judicial appeals jurisdiction was legally inserted along 
with "Board of Appeals" development related action appellate jurisdiction into this table 
and other sections of Chapter 17.57. In making this argument the City disingenuously 
ignores the Trust's arguments that the inclusion of the Boards quasi-judicial appeal 
jurisdiction in that chapter was illegal because its scope is expressly limited to appeals on 
5 
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legislative "land development actions" of the City inapposite to a quasi-judicial appeal 
body. Trust Br. pp 31-32, 36-39, T pp 6-11. Other examples are; (1) the City assumes the 
de facto Board acts as a quasi-judicial body providing due process without disputing the 
Trust's facts and arguments that it operated ad hoc and later by rules under legislative 
Robert's Rules of Order and LDC Chapter 17.57, expressly limited to appeals on 
legislative "land development actions"; (2) the City leaves undisputed the Trust facts and 
arguments that the City was enforcing a new policy of terminating legal nonconforming 
rights on the grounds it was "restoring"-"preserving" the single family character of 
predominantly multi-family neighborhoods; (3) the City claims the right to choose which 
of two appeals entities (Board or Hearing Examiner) it will direct any given 
administrative appeal to; (4) on the one hand the City claims that the Trust appeal would 
have been ripe for appeal to the Hearing Examiner after the Board decision and on the 
other hand that it was of a peculiar type over which the Board had exclusive and final 
jurisdiction. These and other evasions and contradictions will be addressed in the 
argument. 
The meritless, contradictory and evasive arguments in the City's short brief, 
compared with the undisputed facts and law presented in the Trust's full length brief is an 
example of a local governance system that disregards the rule of constitutional law. 
REPLY TO THE CITY'S ARGUMENTS 
A. CONTRARY TO THE CITY ARGUMENT "I", THE AE CODE APPLIES 
TO ALL LEVELS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT 
PROCESS ON ALL ORDINANCE VIOLATIONS INCLUDING THE 
TRUST'S NONCONFORMING RIGHTS DEFENSE TO THE SINGLE 
FAMILY ZONE VIOLATION CHARGE. 
6 
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Based on undisputed facts, the Trust's first argument is that a correct interpretation 
of the AE Code is that it applies not only to quasi-judicial appeals but also to all levels of 
the administrative enforcement of all City ordnance violations including zoning and 
single family zone enforcement as in this case. The Trust's initial focus was on the claim 
that the City should have directed the appeal to the Hearing Examiner under the AE Code 
rather than to the Board. The Trust supported this argument with case citations on general 
rules of interpretation including plain meaning, history and intended purpose with 
relevant quotes from Council minutes and the AE Code. Trust Br. pp 27-30. Those 
arguments are incorporated herein by this reference. 
The foundation of the City's arguments is based on an interpretation of the AE 
Code scope clause that it makes the code a "permissive rather than mandatory 
enforcement mechanism" because it states, "The provisions of this Title may be applied 
to all violations of the Logan Municipal Code...", (emphasis supplied) T 6 p 1. Trust Br. 
p 27, City Br. p 24. The City argues that it was thereby "permitted" not only to direct this 
and all similar appeals to the alternative Board forum but also to disregard the code at all 
stages of administrative enforcement. The City argues that it could also have elected to 
direct these appeals to the Hearing Examiner under the AE Code. This is the pretext the 
City uses to disregard the Trust's arguments regarding the interpretation and application 
of the AE Code throughout the enforcement process. City Br. pp 20-27. 
Additionally, to follow the City's argument that the use of "may" allows for two 
methods of settling disputes, where one of those methods is unconstitutional is irrational 
7 
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and renders the In addition to the City's interpretation without merit for the following 
reasons: 
1) "May" Gives Choices (1) To Enforce (2) By Admin, or Crim. Means: 
The scope clause use of "may" gives the City the choice of enforcing or not enforcing. 
Then, if it chooses to enforce, it "may" also elect administrative or criminal enforcement. 
It does not give the City the right to enforce outside the AE Code, or, the City or litigants 
the right to choose between two appeal forums as the City claims. 
An obvious and compelling reason "may (not "shall") be applied to all violations " 
is used, is inherent in the principle of the separation of powers. The legislature/council 
has the power to make the code law and the executive/mayor has the power to enforce the 
code law. The legislature/council cannot take away the mayor/executive's discretion 
about which violations of its code laws the mayor will enforce and compel the mayor to 
enforce all violations of its code laws sometimes called "prosecutorial discretion". Had 
the council used the words and phrase "shall be applied to all violations", the code law 
would have violated that most fundamental separation principle of constitutional 
governance. 
This voluminous record is a powerful example of the application of this principle 
of executive enforcement discretion (may versus shall) at the core of the separation of 
powers. The current mayor's administration has concluded that over 50% of the 
dwellings in the 1950 city violate the single-family zone code provisions. A code 
provision requiring that the administration "shall" apply/enforce all (including 50%) code 
8 
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violations would not only violate the separation of powers principle, it would also be 
absurd and irrational on many levels. 
The City argument that "may" should be interpreted to "permit" the City or 
litigants to opt out of Code enforcement or pick and choose which of two administrative 
appeal entities a particular case should be assigned to is absurd, irrational and 
unconstitutional, especially where one provides due process to the litigants and the other 
does not. 
The plain meaning of AE Code LDC § 17.60.130 (quoted in City Br. p 24) 
establishes with certainty that "may" as used there and in the scope clause confirms the 
separation of powers discretion of the administration to choose; "may undertake any of 
the procedures herein". It is also expressed by the City Attorney in the legislative history 
that the criminal enforcement was also a "may" option. That section also expressly 
provides that if the administration does choose to administratively enforce, all levels of 
the enforcement process are subject "to the provisions of this Title (the AE Code)". The 
City has denied this sweeping application of the AE Code to the entire elective 
enforcement process. It ends with its grant of power "to use any remedy available under 
this Title (AE Code)". There is an open question as to whether or not, and to what extent, 
the AE Code may apply when the city elects to enforce through criminal proceedings. 
Because this section has such a profound effect in resolving many issues raised by the 
City and resolves critical arguments it failed to counter, it is quoted in full with emphasis 
supplied. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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General Enforcement Authority: 
Whenever an administrative official finds that a violation of the Logan Municipal 
Code or applicable state codes has occurred or continues to exist, he may 
undertake any of the procedures herein. The director or any designated 
enforcement official shall have the authority to gain compliance with the 
provisions of the Logan Municipal Code and applicable state codes subject to the 
provisions of this Title. Such authority shall include the power to issue notices of 
violation and administrative citations, inspect public and private property, abate 
nuisances on public and private property, and to use any remedy available under 
this Title or law. (emphasis supplied) AE Code LDC § 17.60.130, T 6 p 3 
The City, after making it's foundation argument that "may" gives it the discretion 
to disregard the AE Code in administrative enforcement proceedings and permission to 
elect forums, states: "Applying these principles here, the plain and unambiguous terms of 
the Administrative Enforcement Code make its application to any proceeding concerning 
a violation permissive, rather than mandatory". City Br. p 26. The correct "plain and 
unambiguous" meaning is this - if the City elects to enforce and enforce with 
administrative rather than criminal enforcement it cannot then elect to disregard the AE 
Code as it has done and claims the right to do. At a minimum degree of credibility, the 
City's foundation argument is without merit and its dependent arguments thus fail. 
2) City's "May" Interpretation Fails On Other Constitutional Grounds: 
There are additional ways in which the City's interpretation contradicts a rational 
construction rule that provides a more comprehensive view of the systemic breakdown 
evident in the extensive undisputed record in this case: 
A statute subject to interpretation is presumed not to have been intended to 
produce absurd consequences, but to have the most reasonable operation that its 
language permits. If possible, doubtful provisions should be given a reasonable, 
rational, sensible and intelligent construction. 73 Am Jur 2d Statutes § 265 (1974 
ed. unchanged in 2001 supplement). 
10 
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It is irrational etc. to give a city the unfettered discretion to enforce ordinances 
without applying the AE Code. The absurdity is only compounded by also giving the City 
the option to choose which of two quasi-judicial appellate bodies will hear the appeal, 
even if both quasi-judicial forums in fact provided due process to the litigants. The 
irrationality is further multiplied in this case where it is undisputed that the optional de 
facto lay Board of five operates under legislative Robert's Rules of Order inapposite to 
AE Code due process Hearing Examiner (law school graduate) forum option provides 
detailed expanded due process protections to litigants. The City has not disputed the 
Trust's facts and arguments shown in the following table (herein Table 1). 
No Due Process Rights in Board | AE Code Due Process Rights in 
of Adjustment Proceedings T 5 pp 4-5 | Hearing Examiner Proceedings T 6 
i 
Right of Litigants to Notice of Due Process Procedural Rules 
None (only late Robert's legislative rules) | §... 180 
Right to Cross Examine Sworn Adverse Witnesses 
None | §...230 D. 
Right to Present Sworn-Affidavit Proof Testimony at Hearing 
None | §...230 D 
Right to Present Telephonic-Electronic Sworn Proof 
None | §...230 D 
Right to Subpoena Witnesses, Documents and Other Evidence 
None | §...220 C 
Informal Exchange of Discovery May be Required 
None | §...230 A 
Judicial Body-Judge Without a Personal or Financial Interest 
None | §...210 B.l. 
City Has Burden to Prove Illegality (undisputed, Trust Br. pp 33-34) 
Burden to Prove Legality on Owner | §...230 B.,C. 
Right to Establish Grounds for a New Hearing 
None | §...230 D. 
11 
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Many pivotal City arguments are in denial of the de facto Board's pervasive disregard for 
due process in both its pre 2007 ad hoc proceedings and its post 2007 invalid legislative 
rules proceedings. This systemic pattern of due process denial was argued by the Trust 
and never challenged by the City. It is disingenuous for the City to repeatedly assume in 
its determinative arguments that the de facto (quasi-judicial?) Board's proceedings 
provide due process without countering the Trust's arguments to the contrary. Trust Br. 
pp 36-40. 
3) The City Ignores The Rule That Legislative Intent Is Determinative: 
Threaded through the City arguments are claims that the AE Code was only intended as 
an alternative administrative remedy to the Board of Adjustment and that nonconforming 
rights determinations were not covered. These claims are in denial and disregard of the 
undisputed facts and Trust arguments that the Council, in adopting the AE Code, 
expressly intended that the AE Code was the sole administrative enforcement process for 
all ordinance violations and particularly for grandfathering and other occupancy capacity 
questions. Trust Br. pp 28-29. 
In the interpretation of statutes, the legislative will is the all-important and 
controlling factor. Indeed it is frequently stated in effect that the intention of the 
legislature constitutes the law. Accordingly, the primary rule of construction of 
statutes is to ascertain and declare the intention of the legislature, and to carry such 
intention into effect, to the fullest degree. A construction adopted should not be 
such as to nullify, destroy, or defeat the intention of the legislature. 73 Am Jur 2d 
Statutes §145 (1974 ed. unchanged in the 2001 supplement) 
12 
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4) Inserting Board In Development Appeals Ch.17,57 Violates MLUDMA Et Al. 
In order to rationalize the existence of the Board as a legally viable option to the AE 
Code Hearing Examiner, the City argued that the quasi-judicial Board's "bare bones" 
1997 organic ordinance was "fleshed out" by the Board's insertion into LDC Chapter 
17.57. City Br. 26. Conspicuously absent from its argument was the uncontested fact that 
the scope of that chapter provided "appeals procedures for development related actions of 
the City", not for appeal procedures for quasi-judicial due process appeals as required by 
MLUDMA and due process. City Br. p 26. All the other appeal entities included were in 
the legislative development business, not dispensing quasi-judicial due process. It is 
alarming that the Director who's decisions are appealed "shall prepare administrative 
procedures" (also missing) for the Board in the Chapter and the Board is required to 
prepare its own administrative procedures under the 1997 ordinance. The erroneous 
inclusion of the de jure quasi-judicial, but de facto legislative Board is appalling from a 
due diligence perspective and is another example of an irrational, confusing and 
conflicting system that defies the rule of law. The City never challenged the Trust's 
arguments on this point. Trust Br. pp 31-32. This anomaly apparently originated with the 
1997 Ordinance from a lack of understanding the fundamental difference between the 
extant development entities and the City's first quasi-judicial forum and has never been 
corrected. MLUDMA and the AE Code, borrowed almost verbatim from Provo, 
apparently failed to alert the City to this cardinal error and may partly explain how the 
City got off track regarding due process. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(Housley) As far as the due process goes he refers to the lack thereof. Admittedly 
we did not have bylaws passed but that is not where the due process rights are 
contained...Ordinance and that is contained in Chapter 17 or Title 17 Chapter 57 
of our Land Use Code... F 35, R 150(1) p 11. 
Housley's repeated claims that specific legislative procedures constituted due 
process, quoted in full at F 35, leads to the conclusion that he either misunderstood or 
knew better and was addressing the lay Board members, not the Trustee. He had drafted 
the AE Code with its expanded due process rights detailed in Table 1. Trust Br. p 29. 
B. THE CITY'S REMAINING POINT «I" ARGUMENTS ARE WITHOUT 
MERIT 
The City concludes its Point "I" argument with a description of a confused de 
facto administrative enforcement system that by comparative analysis bears little or no 
resemblance to its de jure legal system. 
On the other hand, no statute or ordinance designates a Hearing Examiner under 
the Administrative Enforcement Code as an appeal authority. Based on the 
structure of the ordinances, if a "responsible person" claims a nonconforming use 
right, that claim must be resolved through the appropriate land use appeal process 
before there is even a "violation" a Hearing Examiner could address. Only if 
Daines were to continue to use his dwelling as three units in violation of the 
Board's decision would the Administrative Code and a Hearing Examiner be a 
permissive option to be used to enforce what would then be a code violation. 
No cites are given to support these claims. The first sentence basis for what 
follows appears to deny that the Hearing Examiner under the AE Code is an ordinance 
established quasi-judicial "appeal authority to hear and decide.. .appeals from decisions 
applying the land use ordinances" as required by Utah Code § 10-9a-701(l). The Council 
and City Attorney insisted that the code was intended primarily to enforce land use 
violations including grandfathering, covered all ordinance violations and was included in 
14 
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the Land Development Code. Trust Brief p 26, T pp 25-26. The next sentence appears to 
be taken out of context from the AE Code LDC § 17.60. 220 F, phrase "if a person claims 
a nonconforming right" and then distorts its meaning by (1) omitting "as a defense" after 
"right" and; (2) substituting "appeals" for "determinations of the existence of 
nonconforming rights". Trust Br. p 30. Even if this distorted sentence is taken at face 
value, the last sentence that gives the City the "permissive option" after Board appeal to 
opt back to the AE Code Hearing Examiner to enforce the Board decision makes no 
sense. Even if that is the case, the provision would clearly deny nonconforming rights due 
process by the Board and equal protection given other similar rights not subject to those 
proceedings. Ironically this argument assumes first that the Hearing Examiner is not an 
appeal authority, then switches to the assumption he is and that the code applies to all 
appeals, treats nonconforming rights appeals differently, then all other appeals continue 
through the Hearing Examiner with ultimate enforcement power in all cases electively in 
the Hearing Examiner. This argument is not only irrational but also disingenuous because 
the City failed to counter the Trust brief argument points and authorities on the effect of 
the above cited unique nonconforming rights as a defense section of the AE Code under 
three subtopics, A. 4, A. 5 and A. 6. Trust Br. pp 30-31. 
This claimed right of the City (or litigant) to select whether an appeal will go to a 
legally trained Hearing Examiner dispensing due process or a to a lay Board of five who 
operate under Robert's Rules of Order is unconstitutional on its face. Table 1. The record 
in this case establishes how the application of'thepermissive forum selection process has 
resulted in a corrupt system, whether or not so intended. 
15 
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Pursuant to a GRAMA request in February 2011 the City delivered to the Trustee 
copies of all Requests for Administrative Hearings and Determinations of the Hearing 
Examiner from the inception of the AE Code. They are "Exhibit # 1" pp 1-23. There are 
six total cases abstracted on page "A". Four are represented by lawyers. They include 
land use, park strip, nonconforming use control, over occupancy and signage violations. 
In a Council meeting on August 18, 2009: "Attorney Housley said staff decisions could 
be appealed to the Board, i.e., parking permits or on-site solutions." T 10 p 14. 
C. CONTRARY TO THE CITY'S POINT "II" ARGUMENT, THE TRUST 
ESTABLISHED AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT, 1) THE LATE RULES 
DID NOT APPLY TO THE TRUST APPEAL, AND 2) WERE INVALID 
ON THEIR FACE AND WERE A DE FACTO LEGISLATIVE PRETEXT 
TO CONTINUE THE DE FACTO BOARD'S ULTRA VIRES 
PROCEEDINGS. 
In Point II of its argument, the City (pp 27-29) carved out a very narrow challenge 
to the Trust's broad § 1983 claim that the de facto Board acted in a pattern disregarding 
the rule of constitutional law based on arguments in the Trust Br. pp 36-40. The City 
narrows its challenge to a named few of the Trust's claims which it calls 
"characterizations" and adds: "However these characterizations are wholly unsupported 
by any citation to applicable authority of the Board's bylaws and rules." Those claims 
and all the related broader claims the City does not challenge are based on undisputed 
facts and established as a matter of law with applicable authority. Trust Br. pp 36-40. 
D. BASED ON THE UNDISPUTED FACTS MARSHALED IN THE TRUST'S 
BRIEF, THE AUTHORITIES CITED ARE INAPPOSITE TO THE CITY'S 
CLAIM THAT NONCONFORMING RIGHTS ARE NOT PROTECTABLE 
PROPERTY INTERESTS FOR PURPOSES OF §1983 DUE PROCESS 
CLAIMS. 
16 
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Under Point "IIP the City argues that the Trust's due process claims fail as a 
matter of law, (1) because a nonconforming right is not a protectable property interest; 
(2) because the Board provided the procedural due process protections required by the 
circumstances, and; (3) because the Director's denial was not arbitrary, capricious, or 
without a rational basis. City Br. pp 29-31 
The two cases the City cites challenging a nonconforming property right as a 
protectable property interest in fact are powerful authority supporting nonconforming 
rights as protectable property interests. Under Heldaman v. Washington City, 2007 UT 
App 11 a nonconforming right qualifies as "an interest in which one has a legitimate 
claim of entitlement. It is not an abstract need for, or a unilateral expectation of, a benefit. 
Rather, it is a right of a particular decision reached by applying the facts". Under 
Patterson v. American Fork City, 2003 UT 7, a nonconforming right is not a claim of 
entitlement to a favorable land use decision from a legislative planning and zoning board, 
but rather is a right to a decision reached by a quasi-judicial forum applying rules to facts 
under Heldaman. City Br. pp 29-30. 
Under the cases cited in City Br. p 30 on procedural due process, it may have 
required an analysis of the circumstances to determine whether the Board provided 
procedural due process from 1997 to the 2004 AE Code, because there was no city 
ordinance that provided due process rules. On the adoption of the AE Code with its 
expanded due process requirements, the de facto Board that had no due process rules was 
and is required to provide the same due process protections provided in the Code. In 
exercising its remaining quasi-judicial original jurisdiction over variances, the Board is 
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required to follow those rules under this doctrine and MLUDMA. The 1997 Ordinance 
also requires that in variances AE Code due process rules must replace its invalid 
legislative rules. 
The City's argument on page 31 regarding the Trust's substantive due process 
claim is included in the City's Point "IV". The Trust's reply to that point will cover that 
subject, 
E. THE CITY'S ARGUMENT ON EQUAL PROTECTION 
MISREPRESENTS THE UNDISPUTED FACTS THAT SHOW THE 
TRUST'S CLAIM IS ESTABLISHED AS A MATTER OF LAW 
The City argues that the Trust's uclass of one" discriminatory enforcement claim 
fails. City Br. pp 32-35. This whole argument is based on an unconscionable 
misrepresentation and denial of the relevant record facts that the City expressly "does not 
dispute". City Br. p 7. The undisputed "class of one" facts were marshaled in F 12 pp 12-
13 and in the "D. Trust: Class-of-One & Civil Rights Retaliation Victim" argument in the 
Trust's brief. Trust Br. pp 40-43. When the authorities cited by the City are applied to the 
marshaled facts that the City does not dispute, they show that the Trust has established its 
"class of one" discriminatory enforcement claim as a matter of law. The City 
misrepresents and omits from its "characterization", the undisputed facts that establish 
the Trust's claim as a matter of law. 
To establish that the City's decision could constitute some sort of equal 
protection violation, Daines relies upon the "class of one" rationale described in 
Willowbrook v. Olecbu 528 U.S. 562...Daines characterizes the City's request that 
he apply for a grandfathering exemption as retaliation for his accusation that the 
City had attempted to "extort" a gift of street frontage and as "targeting] this 
beautiful home." These arguments fail for several reasons. City Br. p 32. 
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False: "City's request that he apply for a grandfathering exemption". Undisputed 
fact: "The initiation of single-family zone violation charge in the Compliance Request 
Letter preceded by a warrant-less search resulted...". Trust Br. p 40. False grounds: 
"accusations that the City had attempted to "extort" a gift of street frontage and as 
"target(ing) this beautiful home". The core omitted undisputed facts and other related 
undisputed facts that establish the claim as a matter of law are; "Multi-family neighbors 
on both sides were similarly situated, did not accuse the City of attempted gift extortion 
and have not been charged with single family zone violations". Trust Br. p 41. 
These undisputed facts qualify the Trust's claim under all the authorities cited in 
both briefs. 
F. THE UNDISPUTED FACTS ESTABLISH THAT THE DIRECTOR'S 
DECISION AT ISSUE WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. 
The City's argument for denying the Trust's claim that the Director's denial of its 
grandfathering claim was arbitrary/capricious is based on the City's claim that the Trust 
has not met the burden of proof and failed to "marshal the evidence" as required. City Br. 
pp 35-37. The record establishes that the Trustee has gone to extraordinary lengths to 
research, define and comply with evidence marshaling requirements in this case with 
over seventy pages of undisputed facts in the summary judgment pleadings, a large 
record and numerous issues within the brief length limits. The marshaling of the facts on 
this arbitrary/capricious issue is a good example and will show the Trust has indeed 
marshaled and met the burden. The denial of the Trustee's request for 15 more pages 
required more fact and argument summarizing in this part. See Trust Br., argument pp 
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44-45, facts fl 21-26 pp 15-18: summary judgment pleading facts, Tabs 1-3 and the 
voluminous record as referenced. 
G. ANDERSON V. PROVO MISREPRESENTED: IT SUPPORTS THE 
TRUST ARGUMENTS ON TERMINATION POLICY, EQUAL 
PROTECTION AND LICENSING. 
The City stated that Anderson v. Provo City 2005 UT 5 declared the Provo 
landlord licensing ordinance, the pattern for Logan's landlord licensing ordinance, 
constitutional This is false. Anderson declared a zoning ordinance amendment 
constitutional that required an owner to occupy the primary unit in order to rent the 
accessory unit in a zone which had always been zoned single family, because it would 
"maintain the single family character of the neighborhood" which had always been 
single family. Exhibit 3. Logan borrowed this terminology as a pretext to justify its 
nonconforming rights termination policy when Anderson was inapposite to Logan's case 
where the zones had always been predominantly multi-family in character and zoned as 
such since 1950. 
Logan, in declaring its rights termination policy in 2006, stated that a future Provo 
style landlord licensing ordinance would be a good way to ratchet up enforcement of its 
new policy. The comparison of Logan's 2010 licensing ordinance (T 9) with Provo's 
(Exhibit 4) shows the Provo ordinance is missing the provision Logan put in its ordinance 
to cany out the council-mayor's policy of terminating nonconforming rights to "return 
neighborhoods to their single family character" by forced inspections and forced 
grandfathering. See T 9 p 2, LMC § 5.17.050 C. Logan's licensing ordinance has a 
provision that exempts from licensing and forced grandfathering, a multi-family dwelling 
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where the owner occupies one of the units. T 9 p 1, LMC § 5.17.030 D. This provision 
denies equal protection under Anderson when Logan's versus Provo's different 
circumstances are factored in. 
H. CAUSATION 
The root cause of the pattern of disregard of the law that has become evident at the 
conclusion of the briefing in this case goes far deeper than those who are caught up in 
this record. The root cause is a cultural legacy of inordinate trust in local government 
officials "to do the right things" that has unwittingly silenced the rule of constitutional 
law in local government. This legacy has been insulated from effective judicial review by 
the "technique of economic defenses": 
"Insurance companies and large corporate litigants have embarked upon the 
technique of economic defenses, making the prosecution of a case financially 
impossible for most litigants. Injuries of minor value, regardless of how deserving, 
cannot be addressed because of the cost involved." 
Utah Bar Journal, February 1990, Commissioner's Report, "Being a Lawyer is Not 
for Everyone", by Jackson B. Howard. Addendum Exhibit 2. 
The reality of this technique is factored into very economically efficient local 
government "risk management" programs that are far less costly than predetermining 
whether proposed legislation and policies comply with law and the constitution, even if 
you were able to change the mentality of the culture. 
The evidence that this legacy existed before many of those involved were born 
appears un the face of the record. Between 1970 and 1997 the City's trusted officials 
amended the 1950 original city-wide multi-family zones to single family. Before down-
zoning, those areas had developed into 50% to 75% multi-family residences in reliance 
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on the 1950 zoning. The constitutionality of this down-zoning has never been challenged 
in Court. 
The landmark case on limitations on zoning power is La Salle National Bank v. 
Cook County (1957), 12 111. 2d 40, 145 N.E. 2d 65. The court set fourth five factors in 
evaluating the validity of a zoning ordinance. It is the Trustee's opinion that those down-
zonings were clearly beyond the City's zoning power under that case. It is submitted that 
in those down-zonings, as with the policies and legislation in this record, that the trusted 
local officials believe they serve the public best by responding to "public clamor" and let 
the efficient risk management program take care of the legal technicalities. 
It is further submitted that a proper decision from this court could provide 
guidelines to start a trend back to an ancient legacy of the rule of constitutional law in 
local government. The Trustee is convinced that, with those guidelines, the present Logan 
officials are as capable as can be found to lead the way back. 
CONCLUSION 
The Conclusions on page 49 of the Trusts brief are incorporated herein. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED September 2 ^ l 0 1 1 . 
/ ^KT^X^\ 
D a ^ K . ^ a m e s 
Pro Se/Attorney Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
7th On September 27 , 2011,1 hand-delivered two copies of the foregoing Reply 
Brief of Appellant to each of the following: 
Jody K. Burnett 
Robert W. Keller 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5678 
And 
Kymber D. Housley 
Logan City Attorney 
290 North 100 West 
Logan, UT 84323 
Pro Se/Attorney Appellant 
91 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Tabl 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ABSTRACT OF LOGAN CITY 
AE CODE HEARING EXAMINER CASES 
The cases are in the order they appear in the answer to the GRAMA request. 
Order Date [Name [Pages [Attorney | Subject Notes 
1. Jan 8 09 Ricks 4-9 H. Olsen Nonconforming use-nuisance 
2. Sep 20 06 Darley 10-11 Park strip change 
3. Jan 4 07 Skabelund 12-14 G.Skabelund Nuisance-vehicles etc- atty.requests hearing 
per Notice of Violation-
4. Mar 26 07 Robinson 15-19 Z.Froerer Single-Family over occupancy, 5 v 3 
- p. 18 order " that the responsible persons request that the case be 
transferred to the Board of Adjustment is DENIED based on record of 
Board of Adjustments Dated January 14, 2003". 
-p. 19 requests a hearing on the notice of violation. 
5. Oct 14 09 Seethaller 20-22 M. Jensen Shed set back violation 
6. Dec 5 08 Nielsen 23 Temporary sign violation 
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James Geier 
Neighborhood Improvement/CDBG Manager 
290 North 100 West 
Logan, UT 84321 
(435)7169027 
David R. Daines 
Attorney at Law 
1158 North 1750 East 
Logan, UT 84341 
Dear Attorney Daines: 
I have prepared copies of requests for Administrative Hearings and Administrative Enforcement Orders 
found in our City records. If you have any other requests and can supply us with any specific names or 
cases we will be happy to make them available to you. 
Sincerely, 
r
~ ^ > /[' i * • 
Pam Collins 
Neighborhood Improvement Secretary 
Phone number: (435) 716-9025 
Fax number (435) 716-9001 
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^ [ / 
Mayor Randy Watts 
Logan City 
290 North 100 West 
Logan. Utah 84321 
Dear Mayor: 
it?avi§ 21. $>a\nz$ 
Mtornty at law 
1158 Iflortf) 1750 -Cast 
Xogan Xltafj 84341 
Tfcef: 435^753^721 teff 512/8562 
January 22,2011 
Re: Request for City Records 
CERTIFIED MAIL RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED 
This is a request pursuant to Utah Code Sec. 63-2-101 et. seq. as amended to produce 
copies of the following Logan City Records within the time required. When I receive telephone 
notice at one of the above numbers that those copies are ready.. 1 wil^pay the prescribed copy fees 
and receive the record copies; '" -
... ...RECORDS REQUESTED: 
1. ' Copies of al 1 Polices and Pf6cedures:ad opted-p^Btt&m.:tA\§ 174fy.104vaf;tl}e. 
Administrative Enforcement Code which states: 
"The Mayor shall establish policies and procedures for the holding of administrative 
enforcement hearings, the appointment of hearing examiners, and. the use of the administrative 
procedures herein by enforcement officials." 
This request includes a request for the original and all amendments or changes and the 
dates of each. 
2. Copies of all "Requests for Administrative Enforcement Hearings11 submitted to 
the Community Development Director pursuant to § 17.60.190 B of the Administrative 
Enforcement Code. 
3. Copies of all the Determinations of the Hearing Examiner entered pursuant to 
§17.60.220 et. seq. Administrative Enforcement Code regarding all Requests for Hearings. 
A. Copies ofttecordjiagsHn all forms and minutes if any of the proceed ngs of the 
"joinJ-Avorkshop between the Municipal Council and Planning Commission" held on Thursday 
November 9,2006. 
If questions arise-concerning this request other than, ad vising: me of timely .compliance. 1 
request that they be addressed through E-Mail to me at ^<MLl§5j2(^ 
Sincerely,, , ^ V ) y j 9 s 
'''••• -
; :f:
 ;•D.avid RTDai'nes 
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C I l ^ U N I t t C> UJ i t A..V » C t 
CDMMUNHVD:VtiOPMEHI 
255 NORTH WAIN STREET, LOGAN, UTAH 84321 
PHONE 435.716.9020 FAX 435.716.9001 
http//comdev.loganutah.org 
Date Rcvd/Initials 
Time Received 
GRAMA 
REQUEST FORM 
Utah Code §63-2-204. Requests - Time limit for response and extraordinary circumstances. 
(1) A person making a request for a record shall furnish the governmental entity with a written 
request containing: 
(a) the person's name, mailing address, and daytime telephone number, if available; and 
(b) a description of the record requested that identifies the record with reasonable specificity. 
Date: 
Print Name: 
Email Address: 
Mailing Address: 
A FEE MAY APPLY: $_ 
0 - O - ! I 
ISL/^A y^As (S^/XA/r^J?^ 
Phone Number: 
REQUEST (include property address): J 5 J U L / CKJJ^OU^JAAU^ , J)fitjft £_£_ 
Information/Copies Received By: 
Date: 
OFFICE USE ONLY: ~ 
Completed By: /• LtiJbi** Dace: _ A _ _ ± L _ _ 
# of Pages Copied 2 [ Format___ 
Date Notified Date Sent 
File Saved As: 
$5.00 x 3-.5~ 
$ .15 x X\ 
Total 
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ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 
CITY OF LOGAN, STATE OF UTAH 
CITY OF LOGAN, DEPARTMENT OF 
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, 
NEIGHBORHOOD IMPROVEMENT 
Enforcement Authority, 
v. 
EDWARD S & MICKEY JEN RICKS, 
Responsible Persons 
Location of Violations80 S HIGHWAY 89/91, 
Logan 
Violation(s): §17.59.050 A., Nonconforming 
Uses, Enlargement and §8.38.020 Refuse/Junk 
Vehicles 
Tax ID: 03-013-0008/0009 
STIPULATION, FINDINGS AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT 
ORDER 
Case No 08-250 
HEARING EXAMINER: PAUL LARSEN 
STIPULATION 
The parties to this action stipulate to the following Findings and Order. 
Dated this _ V _ Day of January 09 / 
f-JJ-^CXVjC- L 2 
Edward S. Ricks 
Responsible Person 
^ yY\s^^;t,v^?^4^ 
Mickey Jen Rioks 
Responsible Person 
tu ( A ^=Sr Vierm Olsen 
Attorney for E-k^ard S. Ricks and Mickey 
Jen Ricks .// /,.- --.. 
£r>/L— ) 
Lee/Edwards -> 
Attorney for City of Logan 
FINDINGS 
On September 09, 2008, the Planning & Zoning Division with the Department of Community 
Development initiated action with Neighborhood Improvement Division, regarding the property 
at 3180 S HIGHWAY 89/91, Logan. The responsible persons listed above are doing business 
at the above location, known as Ted's Service, 
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Page 2 of 3 
On or about the date of September 10, 2008, there were an estimated one hundred twenty four 
vehicles located on the two parcels in question, in addition, to a significant amount of 
miscellaneous vehicle parts, tires, weathered lumber, and other refuse. This conflicts with a 
judicially approved stipulation of parties in case number 91-0000219 (Cache County, Plaintiff, v. 
Edward Scott Ricks and Mickey Jen Ricks, Defendants, dated April 24, 1990) 
The current conditions on the properties, constitutes an expansion of the previous legally 
existing use, wherein, fifty vehicles may be stored on the property; twenty (in what is referred to 
as parcel 2) and thirty (in parcel 1) in respective parcels. In addition, the premises are strewn 
with refuse. 
A Notice of Violation was served on October 16, 2008 to EDWARD S & MICKEY JEN RICKS for 
a violation on real property located at 3180 S HIGHWAY 89/91, Logan. 
On October 20, 2008, EDWARD S & MICKEY JEN RICKS reserved the right of appealing the 
Notice of Violation to the Department of Community Development and consequently, an 
Administrative Enforcement Hearing was scheduled. After the hearing was scheduled, the 
parties reached an agreement and have stipulated to these findings and the following Order: 
ORDER 
Pursuant to Logan Municipal Code Sections 17.59.050 A., 8.38.020, 17.60.250, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED: 
1. that the Notice of Violation to EDWARD S & MICKEY JEN RICKS, dated October 16, 
2008, is AFFIRMED; 
2. that EDWARD S & MICKEY JEN RICKS cease from violating the Logan Municipal Code 
§ 8.38.020 Refuse/Junk Vehicles; and take any necessary corrective action by February 
28, 2009 to correct the above mentioned violation; 
3. that EDWARD S & MICKEY JEN RICKS cease from violating the Logan Municipal Code 
§17.59.050 A., Nonconforming Uses, and take any necessary corrective action, with 
respect to the front portion of the property referred to as Parcel 2, corrective action 
requires that the responsible persons have no more than twenty vehicles on this parcel 
by February 28, 2009 to correct the above mentioned violation. With respect to the rear 
portion of the property referred to as Parcel 1, corrective action requires that the 
responsible persons have no more than thirty vehicles on this parcel by May 31, 2009 to 
correct the above mentioned violation; 
4. that a penalty of $50.00 per day will incur every day after February 28, 2008 for any 
continuing violations listed in paragraph 2, until the property is brought into compliance 
with the Logan Municipal / Land Development Code, with the maximum accrual of 
$1,000.00 per violation. 
5. that a penalty of $50.00 per day will incur every day after any continuing violations of the 
respective dates in paragraph 3, until the property is brought into compliance with the 
Logan Municipal / Land Development Code, with the maximum accrual of $1,000.00 per 
violation. 
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6. that the responsible person(s) allow agents of Logan City to enter the premises and/or 
inspect the property with reasonable notice to ensure compliance beginning February 
28, 2009, and for one year after the date of compliance. 
Dated this ^  Day of January 09 
<j^ Larsen 
Hearing Examiner 
fi^<iA 
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ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 
CITY OF LOGAN, STATE OF UTAH 
CITY OF LOGAN, DEPARTMENT OF 
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, 
NEIGHBORHOOD IMPROVEMENT 
Enforcement Authority, 
v. 
EDWARD S & MICKEY JEN RICKS, 
Responsible Persons 
Location of Violation:3180 S HIGHWAY 89/91, 
Logan 
Violation(s): §17.59.050 A., Nonconforming 
Uses, Enlargement and §8.38.020 Refuse/Junk 
Vehicles 
Tax ID: 03-013-0008/0009 
STIPULATION, FINDINGS AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT 
ORDER (MODIFIED) 
Case No 08-250 
HEARING EXAMINER: PAUL LARSEN 
STIPULATION 
The parties to this action stipulate to modify the findings and order entered into on vJanuary 8, 
2009 as follows: 
1. The parties agree that the responsible persons may have until June 30, 2009 to 
complete the corrective action and have no more than thirty vehicles on the rear portion 
of the property referred to as Parcel 1. 
2. That the responsible persons will incur a penalty of $50.00 per day for every day after 
June 30, 2009, until the property is brought into compliance with the Logan Municipal 
Code and Land Development Code, with the maximum accrual of $1,000.00 per 
violation if the corrective action referred to in paragraph 1 is not completed by the date 
specified. 
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3. The parties understand that this extension is being granted due to unforeseen 
circumstances and that no further extension will be granted. 
All other terms and conditions not referenced above remain in force as set forth in the original 
findings and order. 
Dated this A Day of June 09 
lerm Olsen 
Attorney for Edward S. Ricks and Mickey Jen Ricks 
Dated this / $A)ay of June 09 
-^o 
/ 
+~ ^ 
l^eafdwards 
Attorney for City of Logan 
ORDER 
Pursuant to the above stipulation, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the time for compliance may 
be extended as set forth in the above stipulation. 
Dated this Day of June 09 
..-•^ # "\ 
Paul Larsen c—-^ 
Hearing Examiner 
, /%^?-£3-^-w 
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DEPARTMENT CJF C< >M1H INI^Y DLVET W E I T 
255 North Main • Logan, Utah 84321 "'• 435-716-9025 • Fax 435-/16-9UU1 
w \\\\ .kmanuinh.opj 
ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT OF LOGAN CITY 
CACHE COUNTY, UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF 
Bruce Parley, Responsible Person 
248 East 500 North 
Logan, UT 84321 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
ENFORCEMENT ORDER 
ADDRESS OF SUBJECT PROPERTY 
248 East 500 North 
Logan, UT 
Case No. 04-1012 
Hearing Examiner-Paul Larsen 
Respondent appeared for a hearing on Monday, September 20, 2004, and the following judgment and 
order was entered: 
FINDING: 
The site visit conducted on August 9, 2004, confirmed the City Right-of-Way had been changed 
without the written permission of the Director of Public works in violation of Land Development 
Code §17.39.140 B. 
ORDER: 
1. The property owner shall comply by November 1, 2004 to correct the above mentioned violation. 
All rock gravel shall be removed from the City Right-of-Way. The park strip shall be re-
landscaped where the rock gravel was removed in order to prevent parking in the front setback 
and in the right-of-way. The owner is responsible to comply and schedule an inspection by the 
Department of Community Development, at 716-9025, prior to November 1, 2004. 
2. The responsible person shall pay a $95 Hearing Fee by October 20, 2004, to the Department of 
Community Development at 255 North Main Street, Logan, Utah 84321. 
3. A penalty of $50.00 per day will incur every day after Novemberl, 2004, until the property is 
brought into compliance with City Ordinance. 
DATED: 
~r / 
"7" 
£L&4 
J 
'r? %J 
Paul Larsen 
Hearing Examiner 
/PL^A^, 
D 
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CITY OF LOGAN UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 
255 North Main • Logan, Utah 84321 • 435-716-9025 * Fax 435-716-9001 
www.logauutah.org 
ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT OF LOGAN CITY 
CACHE COUNTY, UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF 
D WAYNE SKABELUND, Responsible Person: ADMINISTRATIVE 
ENFORCEMENT ORDER 
ADDRESS OF SUBJECT PROPERTY: Case No. 06-288 
305 South 600 West, Logan, Utah Hearing Examiner - Paul Larsen 
Respondent appeared for an Appeal Hearing on, Thursday, January 4, 2007, and the followhag 
judgment and order was entered: 
RECOMMENDED FINDINGS 
Neighborhood Improvement (NI) received a complaint regarding the subject property at 
305 Soutli 600 West. On August 29, 2006, Code Compliance Inspector John Lisonbee 
conducted a site visit and found miscellaneous refuse (including windows, basketball 
standard, etc.). In addition, several unregistered vehicles along with a camper were 
parked/located in the property setbacks (yard area). To date the property has not been 
brought into compliance. 
RECOMMENDED ORDER 
1. Remove or properly store the camper outside the setbacks, in addition, to any and 
all inoperable vehicles on the property, or if defendant chooses to notwithstanding 
any other provision keep up to, but no more than, two (2) inoperable, junked or 
unused vehicles on his or her property so long as the vehicles are kept behind a 
six foot (6') opaque fence or structure which has the effect of blocking the view of 
the vehicles from public or private property; and if fenced a required permit 
obtained through Planning & Zoning. 
2. The property owner shall come into compliance by immediately discontinuing 
parking in the property setbacks and remove all established refuse from the 
property by January 19, 2007, pursuant to aforementioned code violations, 
G:\PLANNING\NEIGHBORJ-IOOD MPROVEMENT\Compliance\Enf Address SW 2006X600 W 305 S\DWSkkabehrad 
EnforceinentOrder010407.doc _ 
,<fv I I /a 
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3. The owner is respon^c^u to oon^Jui^ an appumunent witn cue Department of 
Coiiuiiunity Development, Neighborhood Improvement, for an inspection at 716-
9027. 
4. If Mr. D. Wayne Skabehmd fails to comply by January 19, 2007 to the corrections 
specified herein, the City will immediately assess administrative fines which shall 
be $50.00 each day for each separate violation (§17.60380) until the violation i 
corrected. 
is 
DATED: 0//0fS/fi 7 
Paul Larsen 
Hearing Examiner 
C ^ 
I certify that the foregoing is a true and correct 
copy of an original document filed with the 
City of J^ogan, Neighborhood Improvement. 
Date 0 4 ^ X 5 , 2 1 0 ' 7 
7> W l / "EXo A ^r\^a^ 
Secretary of Neighborhood Improvement 
G:\PLANNING\NElGHBORHOOD IMPROVEMEN^Compliance\Enf Address SW 2006X600 W 305 S\DWSkkabelund 
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2176 North Main, Ste. 102 
North Logan,Utah 84341 
(UrBgurrg J&k&bthmb 
Attorney at Law 
435-752-9437 
FAX 753-0077 
REQUEST FOR HEARING 
December 11, 2006 
\£U |* f t $** 
LL 
Department of Community Development 
Neighborhood Improvement/Code Enforcement 
255 North Main Street 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Case No.: 
Responsible Person: 
Location of Alleged Violation; 
Tax ID#: 
CE 06-288 
D. Wayne Skabelund 
305 South 600 West 
Logan, Utah 84321 
(435) 752-6630 
305 South 600 West 
02-030-0017 
To Whom It May Concern: 
Please be advised that the above-named D. Wayne Skabelund requests a 
hearing in accordance with the alleged Notice of Violation, Attorney Gregory Skabelund 
will be making an appearance in his behalf. His address and telephone number are 
listed above. 
Sincer 
iregc^y'Skabelunc 
Attorney at Law 
GS:ab 
cc 
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ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING, DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY 
DEVELOPMENT 
CITY OF LOGAN, STATE OF UTAH 
CITY OF LOGAN, DEPARTMENT OF 
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, 
NEIGHBORHOOD IMPROVEMENT 
/CODE ENFORCEMENT. 
Enforcement Authority, 
v. 
GARY L. ROBISON, 
Responsible Person for property tax 
ID: 07-008-0001 with a physical address of 
910 North 1200 East, Logan, Utah. 
ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT 
ORDER 
Case No. 06-09 
HEARING OFFICER: PAUL LARSEN 
FINDINGS 
1. On January 9, 2006, a complaint was filed with the Department of 
Community Development, Neighborhood Improvement Program, regarding the property 
at 910 North 1200 East, Logan, Utah. The complainant stated that they don't believe that 
the occupancy is only tliree people because there are still 5-7 vehicles on the property and 
sometimes parking on the lawn. 
2. On January 26, 2006, Ordinance Enforcement Officer John Lisonbee and 
Logan Police Sergeant Barry Parslow spoke with Richard Stock who told them that there 
were two or three persons living at this address. After Officer Lisonbee explained that 
they knew that more that tliree unrelated individuals lived there, Mr. Stock admitted that 
the following five men lived at this address: 
Richard Stock with two vehicles, a blue GMC pickup, with a Louisiana license 
plate V483244 and a white Honda Accord, with a Louisiana license plate HAA230. 
Isaac Byrd with a white Ford pickup, license plate 918NHE, registered with the 
address in question. 
Wesley Langston with a black Chevy Malibu, license plate UT 1787P registered 
with the address in question. 
Anthony Lang with a silver Geo Metro, license plate UT 221NLE registered with 
the address in question. 
3. On February 17, 2006, Officer Lisonbee spoke with Mr. Robison at the 
address in question. Mr. Robison admitted that Jason Swazey, David Stock and Richard 
Stock lived at the residence. Mr. Robison stated that Wesley Langston had moved to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Cedar City to go to SUU and thu ~ J d w K xv.lxww u-iyOuit x o a a C Byrd, tvon thougn his 
pickup was in the driveway at that time. 
4. On March 7, 2006, Officer Lisonbee checked the occupancy and found 
five living at this home. Officer Lisonbee made contact with the residence. Officer 
Lisonbee knocked on the door, a male individual answered. Officer Lisonbee gave the 
male individual his card and stated that he was there to find out haw many people lived at 
the residence. The male individual inquired how Officer Lisonbee intended to do that. 
Officer Lisonbee told the male he was required by ordinance to give his name. The male 
individual refused. Officer Lisonbee indicated that he may need to call a police officer 
and asked if the male individual lived there. He stated that he didn't. Officer Lisonbee 
asked if anyone was there that lived in the home. The male asked Tony if he was there. 
Tony was lying on the couch which appeared to be a bed. Officer Lisonbee asked Tony 
if he was Tony Lang. He stated that he was. Officer Lisonbee stepped up to the doorstep 
so he could see and talk to Tony because the man who answered the door was blocking 
the doorway and told Officer Lisonbee he couldn't come into the house. Officer 
Lisonbee told the male at the door he was trying to see Tony so they could talk. Officer 
Lisonbee told the male individual that since he did not live in the home, he had no 
standing and if Tony wished officer Lisonbee not to step in the door step he could ask 
him not to. Tony told "Steven" to quit arguing. Officer Lisonbee asked Tony who lived 
in the home. Tony told Officer Lisonbee that he, Richard, David, Isaac and Jason lived 
there. Officer Lisonbee asked the man who answered the door if he was Steven. He said 
yes but refused to give his last name. Officer Lisonbee went out to the car and was 
writing some notes when Steven came out and started writing notes himself. Steven got 
on his cell phone then went back in the house. He came back out and approached me and 
asked for Officer Lisonbee's name. Officer Lisonbee told him that he already gave him 
his card. Steven asked for another one and Officer Lisonbee gave him one. Officer 
Lisonbee asked if this person was Steven Huber, since a Toyota pickup of his was at the 
address. The male individual said that he wasn't Steven Huber. The male individual re 
entered the house and officer Lisonbee called to have a police officer meet him at the 
address. Officer Lisonbee called dispatch and officer Chad Vernon arrived. Officer 
Vernon indicated that he had also been called to this address by David Stock. After 
David Stock spoke with Officer Vernon, they both came and spoke with Officer 
Lisonbee. David Stock said that only he, his brother Richard and Jason Swazey were 
living at the address. Officer Lisonbee informed David Stock that Tony had told him that 
he, David Stock, Richard Stock, Isaac Byrd and Jason Swazey lived there. David said 
that he did not understand what the problem was and that all of the guys who live at this 
address are good guys and make no trouble. Officer Lisonbee told him that they should 
have reduced the occupancy and there would be no trouble. David Stock said that he 
would not tell me who lived at the house and when I informed that if he lied he could be 
arrested. I told him that he did not have to answer any questions. David Stock did tell 
Officer Lisonbee that "Steven" is Steven Huber. 
5. On March 7, 2006, after the above exchange took place, Officer Lisonbee 
noted that the following vehicles were at the address and appeared not to have been 
moved because they each had snow on them and it had snowed during the night: 
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a blue GMC pickup, with a Louisiana license plate V483244 registered to Richard 
Stock; 
a white Honda Accord, with a Louisiana license plate LIAA230 registered to 
David Stock; 
a white Ford pickup, license plate 918NHE, registered to Isaac C. Byrd; 
a silver Geo Metro, license plate UT 221NLE, registered to Anthony Lang; 
a Toyota pickup, license plate UT 613 W Z , registered to Steven Huber; 
a Toyota Camry, license plate UT 142YEH, registered to Jason Swazey. 
6. On September 4, 2006, Officer Lisonbee and James Geier spoke with 
Steven Huber who said that he and the three Stock brothers live in this home. Steven said 
that Joseph, Richard and David Stock lived there but refused to give us his last name. 
Officer Lisonbee recognized him from an earlier contact when he claimed not to live at 
the house. 
7. On October 31, 2006, James Geier spoke with Mr. Robison, they 
discussed the occupancy issue and Mr. Robinson made statements that he had three 
brothers and another in the residence. Later in the conversation, Mr. Robison stated that 
he had two brothers and two others. 
8. A Notice of Violation was served by posting it on the door of the address 
in question on February 15, 2007. 
9. That the property owner, Gary L. Robison, has and continues to violate 
Logan Municipal Code Section 17.13.050, with regard to occupancy, by allowing more 
occupants than pennitted in the Single Family Traditional District. The property owner 
has allowed more than one family or more that three unrelated adults. 
ORDER 
Pursuant to Logan Municipal Code Section 17.60. 250, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED: 
1. that the Notice of Violation to Gary L. Robison, dated February 15, 2007, 
is AFFIRMED; 
2. that Gary L Robison cease from violating the Logan Municipal Code § 
17.13.060 and to take any necessary corrective action by May 4, 2007. 
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3. that a penalty of $5P n per J-i- - i ! 1 ...:. i __, _jiy after i.L., 4, <,::, : 
until the property is brought into compliance with the Logan Municipal /Land 
Development Code, with a maximum accrual of $1000.00. 
4. that the responsible person allow agents of Logan City to enter the 
premises with reasonable notice for inspection to ensure compliance beginning May 4, 
2007, and for one year after the date of compliance. 
5. that the responsible persons request that the case be transferred to the 
Board of Adjustment is DENIED based on record of Board of Adjustments dated January 
14,2003. 
.DATED t h i s ^ / / £ day of 2007. 
PAUL LARSEN 
HEARING.OFFICER 
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Zane S. Froerer Law Office 
Attorney at Law 
2610 Washington Blvd. p«n
 r 
Ogden, Utah 84401 (H I 
Telephone: 801-389-1533 
Email: zmfroerer6zihotmail.com 
i^fl )PY 
February 22, 2007 
CITY OF LOGAN 
NEIGHBORHOOD IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM 
255 NORTH MAIN 
LOGAN, UTAH 84321 
Re: Case No.: CE 06-09 
Property: 910 North 1200 East 
Client: Gar} Robison 
Subject: Request for hearing on Notice of Violation 
VIA U.S. MAIL 
To Whom It May Concern: 
Gary Robison 
2772 Willowbend Dr. 
Sandy, UT 84093 
Telephone: 801-560-6588 
I have been retained by Mr. Robison to represent him in the above mentioned matter. On 
his behalf he herein requests a hearing on the Notice of Violation served upon his 
property on February i 5, 2007. Please direct ail further correspondence to my office. 
Sincerely, 
LAW OFFICE 
^—£> 
Zane S. Frp^rer 
Attorney ^ 
ZSF 
(Robison: City of Logan vs. Robison.Ltr.Request for hearing.02-22-07 
Page 1 of 1 
n 
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ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 
CITY OF LOGAN, STATE OF UTAH 
CITY OF LOGAN, DEPARTMENT OF 
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, 
NEIGHBORHOOD IMPROVEMENT 
Enforcement Authority, 
v. 
KARL H SEETHALER , Responsible Person 
Location of Violation: 590 CANYON RD 
Violation(s): 
City of Logan, Land Development Code; 
17.15.010 Site Development Standards, 
Residential Districts 
17.46.030 Permit Required before 
Proceeding 
Tax ID: 06-075-0006 
AMENDED ADMINISTRATIVE 
ENFORCEMENT ORDER 
Case No 08-77 
HEARING EXAMINER: PAUL LARSEN 
FINDINGS 
On April 07, 2008 a complaint was filed with the Department of Community Development, 
Neighborhood Improvement Program, regarding the property at 590 CANYON RD, Logan. 
The findings of fact and conclusions of law adopts the Jeff Hansen Survey dated July 15, 2002 
as accurately delineating the true boundary line between the properties in question; this based 
on Judge Low's ruling in Judgment and Decree, Civil #030100618, item #5. 
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Report Summary 
Page 2 of 2 
The shed in question measures 148 square feet, with a height measuring eleven to twelve feet 
two inches. It is within the required eight foot side and ten foot rear setback requirement for 
residential zoning. The shed continues to affect the use of the adjacent property and requires 
corrective action. 
A Notice of Violation was served on July 21, 2009 to KARL H SEETHALER for a violation on 
real property located KARL H SEETHALER. On July 31, 2009, KARL H SEETHALER appealed 
the Notice of Violation to the Department of Community Development and the Administrative 
Enforcement Hearing was scheduled. 
ORDER 
Pursuant to Logan Municipal Code Section(s): 
§17.15.010 Site Development Standards, Residential Districts 
§17.46.030 Permit Required before Proceeding 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. that the Notice of Violation to KARL H SEETHALER, dated July 21, 2009, is AFFIRMED; 
2. that KARL H SEETHALER cease from violating the Logan Municipal Code(s): and to 
take any necessary corrective action in relocating the structure outside the required 
setbacks with permit or remove it from the property by amended date of November 25, 
2009 to correct the above mentioned violation(s); setback requirements are rioted in the 
City of Logan Land Development Code's residential site development standard table. 
3. that the penalty of $50.00 per day per violation will incur every day after the Amended 
date of November 25, 2009 , until the property is brought into compliance with the Logan 
Municipal / Land Development Code, with the maximum accrual of $1,000.00 per 
violation. 
4. that the responsible person(s) allow agents of Logan City to enter upon the property to 
inspect the shed exterior or reconstruction of such with reasonable notice to ensure 
compliance beginning on Amended date of November 25, 2009. 
Dated this /f^Day of October 09 / . . . . / ,
 / r 
V "%+> ^ A -.- ' T^ftr^SPfr 
Paul Larsen l - / 
Hearing Examiner 
Tu 
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OLSON& HOGGAN, PC. 
L BRENT HOCCAN 
MILES P JENSEN 
BRUCE 1. IORCENSEN 
JAMES C JENKINS 
MARLINJ GRANT 
ROBERT B FUNK-
KEVIN J FIFE* 
JEFFERY B. ADAIR" 
KELLY J. SMITH 
JONATHAN R. PALMER 
CHARLES P OLSON (19161975) 
'also licensed in Idaho 
"also licensed in Nevada 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW OGAK 
A U G - 4 / 0 1 ^ 
)UTH MAIN, SUITE 200 
PO BOX 525 
N, UTAH 8422ii0_525 
TELEPHONE {4l£j52^\55T^ 
TOLL FREE (866) 752-1^51 
TELEFAX (4 35) 752-2295 
TREMONTON OFFICE 
j»iy 3i, 2009 ATTORNEY'S 0FFI66: 
123 EAST MAIN 
P.O.BOX 1 15 
REKfeNTON, UTAH 84 3 37-0II5 
'HONE (435) 257-3885 
TELEFAX (435) 257-0365 
E-MAIL oh@oh-pc.com 
www.oh-pc.com 
T orrcs-n f ^ i + V 
- ' — £ > ~ ^ " — \ > 
Attn: Lee Edwards 
255 North Main Street 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Re: REQUEST FOR HEARING - Notice of Violation 
Cambridge Court Apartments - Shed Appeal - 590 Canyon Road, Logan, UT 
Responsible Person: Karl H. Seethaler 
785 E 600 S 
River Heights, UT 84321 
Our FileNo.N~3731.3 
Case No. CE 08-77 
Dear Lee: 
I represent Karl Seethaler in the above referenced matter. Pursuant to the Notice of Violation 
received by the onsite managers of Cambridge Court Apartments, I hereby request a hearing in this 
matter. Please contact me, so that a hearing may be scheduled regarding this matter. I would also 
like to discuss the case with you before we proceed further Thanks. 
Sincerely yours, 
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C. 
Miles P. Jensen 
MPJ/ajd 
Enclosures 
J:\MPJ\Ltr\ledwards.doc 
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LOGAN 
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ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 
CITY OF LOGAN, STATE OF UTAH 
CITY OF LOGAN, DEPARTMENT OF 
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, 
NEIGHBORHOOD IMPROVEMENT 
Enforcement Authority, 
MIKE NIELSEN , Responsible Person 
Location of Violation: 1947 N MAIN ST 
Violation(s): 8-Temp. Signs/Banners 
Tax ID: 04-080-0042 
ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT 
MIKE NIELSEN ORDER 
Case No 08-280 
HEARING EXAMINER: PAUL LARSEN 
FINDINGS 
On October 13, 2008 Code Inspector, John Lisonbee, Department of Community Development, 
Neighborhood Improvement Division, cited Mike Nielsen regarding signage on the property at 
1947 N MAIN ST, Logan. The violation involved two banners posted between poles at Ensign 
Toyota/Honda. Contact was made with the Manager, Mike Nielsen, who acknowledged himself 
as the responsible person for the signage in question. He was issued administrative citation 
#2125, for two counts of 17.40.100, Temporary signs, Banners. 
ORDER 
Pursuant to Logan Municipal Code Section(s), §17.40.100, Temporary signs, Banners; IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. that the Administrative Citation #2125 to MIKE NIELSEN, dated October 13, 2008, is 
AFFIRMED; 
2. that the penalty of $50.00 be assessed, due and payable 
s ^ Dated this1^ Day of December 08 
arsen 
Hearing Examiner 
P' 
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By Jackson B, Howard 
ie 
ic) 
one time, it was the concept that a 
awyer did most everything that was 
id of a lawyer, and specialties were 
iie exception than the rule. Now, it is 
nsensus that the practice of law re-
specialization and specialty practice 
e, in my opinion, the rule than the 
ion. When I began the practice, law 
in Utah were small, and if my rec-
on serves me, the largest law firm in 
n 1949 was approximately six mem-
*Ye now have many firms in Utah with 
than 50 lawyers and a few in the 
borhood of 100 lawyers. This has 
;ed greatly the character and per-
ty of the lawyer. 
J nature of the practice has increased 
Dmplications, and nearly every case 
equires extensive discovery and prep-
n. Even non-litigation cases require 
sive briefing and memorandums. Files 
vould earlier have been a few pages 
ire two or three folders and the cost of 
individual transaction or each indi-
il case has increased exponentially. 
m not sure that all of this change has 
for the good. In fact, a healthy argu-
eould be made that the quality of the 
ice is not better now than it was 40 
> ago, and certainly a wholesome argu-
• could be made that the quality of the 
er is not as good now as it was then. In 
c- - n j : , , 
closure, we have a good many more liti-
gators than lawyers, and the objective now 
is to exhaustively prepare a case for trial, 
even to the extent that trial becomes eco-
nomically impossible. Cases that should be 
tried in a week now take a month to try. We 
deal in a host of side issues rather than 
getting to the heart of the problem. Insur-
ance companies and large corporate litigants 
have embarked upon the technique of eco-
nomic defenses, making the prosecution of 
a case financially impossible for most liti-
gants. Injuries of minor value, regardless of 
how just and deserving, cannot be addressed 
because of the cost involved. 
Supposed simplifications have them-
selves increased the complications of liti-
gation. For example, we now write a 
five-page digest for a 1.0-page brief (Rule 
4-501(1) of the Utah Rules of Jud. Admin.) 
and instead of knowing the basics of plead-
ing as required in the days of code plead-
ings, we now are confronted with rules of 
procedure, rules of evidence, and appellate 
rules for each of the courts, and so, the 
practice of law has frequently been reduced 
to rule interpreting, vis-a-vis, issue resol-
ving. This is not to say that it is all bad, but it 
does point out that it is questionable whether 
we have improved the manner in which law 
is practiced, whether we have elevated the 
quality of practice, and. whether we have 
^nni^ot^ thp fundamental lawyer-like 
qualities required of a true advocate. 
We have further, as lawyers, been com-
promised by industry organizational con-
cepts and the microchip mentality, to the 
detriment of the lawyer as the well-rounded 
scholar conversant with science and the 
humanities, and knowledgeable in history 
and philosophy. We are reducing ourselves 
to technicians and are overwhelmed with the 
need to accumulate technical operating 
data. Because of the vast quantity of infor-
mation we need to understand from recent 
case decisions to computer novations, many 
of us are simply sinking in the swamp of 
data overload, 
While tangential to my basic theme, I 
have concluded that far too many graduates 
of the law schools are not truly qualified to 
be lawyers. I am also of the opinion that the 
practice of law is a great disappointment to a 
sizeable portion of our membership. It 
seems many come to the practice with ex-
pectations that cannot be obtained. All too 
often they don't discover the lack of poten-
tial or their disenchantment until too many 
years have been invested, and the oppor-
tunities to change have been irretrievably 
lost. 
It is my feeling that many of the younger 
lawyers who have come into the profession 
in the last five years should take a strong and 
critical look at the profession to see if it is 
suited for them and their objectives. Many Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of our members would be better off doing a 
number of other things that would bring to 
them a personal satisfaction that they will 
never receive from the practice of law. 
Lawyers who are not excited about what 
they are doing at 5:00 p.m. on a Friday 
afternoon are perhaps not suited to the prac-
tice. 
Life is too short to engage in a profession 
that doesn't bring the personal satisfaction, 
joys and rewards that the individual re-
quires, and to practice law simply because it 
is a profession which gives one standing in 
the community or minimal other reasons is a 
mistake, for to do so undermines the charac-
ter of the individual, precursors failure and 
has a host of deleterious effects to the per-
son, the spouse and the family. 
The truth of these observations is fully 
reflected in the disciplinary proceedings be-
fore the Bar. More concerning, however, 
are those situations that don't make it to the 
discipline level, and are reflected in medi-
ocrity in the performance of professional 
responsibilities. 
It is my belief that a lawyer should think 
of himself as the "best lawyer in the world/' 
and the standard of practice should be 
gauged by the concept that if any other 
lawyer could do it better, then it's the duty 
of the lawyer not to take the case or not to 
undertake the transaction, but to refer it to 
someone else who is better suited, more 
capable, and more devoted to the under-
taking. While this may sound like an unre-
achable hyperbole, what I really mean is 
that before the lawyer takes the assignment 
he may not have all the knowledge and skill 
required, but if he takes the case it is incum-
bent for him to overcome his deficiencies by 
diligent preparation. 
If the practice of law is not a happy home, 
1 would recommend to those who have the 
youth and the will, and are not happy in the 
practice, to think seriously of another occu-
pation, and to take steps to secure that 
change. I know of a number of lawyers who 
have made that decision and who are grati-
fied and pleased that they have done so. The 
testimonies of those people to the happiness 
such change has brought to them is pleasing 
to me and I believe that, ultimately, it con-
stitutes a service to the public. 1 am con-
fident that neither the individual lawyer nor 
the public is well, served by the lawyer 
whose heart is not in the practice. I further 
believe that many of the illnesses that afflict 
the Bar, such as those that I. have mentioned 
above, are in many ways the result of law 
school graduates who become practitioners, 
but not lawyers, 
It is impossible to write a succinct con-
clusion to these rambling observations, 
though it would be adequate to say that for 
one to get more out of the profession he must 
become more of a lawyer and less of a 
technician. Courts and legislators must find 
a way to make litigation a reasonable pro-
cedure for the average citizen, and those 
who are not exhilarated by practicing law 
should quickly and courageously seek an-
other calling. 
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Figure 14.29.150(a). Wall Signs and Painted Wall Signs in the 
PIC Zone. 
Figure 14.29.150(b). Freestanding Signs up to 5 Feet High in the 
Figure 14.29.150(c) Freestanding signs or#r 5 Feet High in the PIC Zone. 
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Chapter 14.30, S - Supplementary Residential 
Overlay Zone. 
14.30.010. Purpose and Objectives. 
14.30.020. Use in Combination. 
14.30.030. Permitted Uses. 
14.30.040. Development Standards. 
14.30.050. Area of Zone. 
14.30.060. Petition for Zone Adoption. 
14.30.070. Parking Requirements. 
14.30.080. Nonconforming Uses. 
14.30.090. Termination of Nonconforming Uses - Recovery 
of Investment. 
14.30.010. Purpose and Objectives. 
The purpose of the Supplementary Residential (S) Overlay 
Zone is to recognize the unique character of Provo City as a 
"university community" and to accommodate supplementary living 
accommodations in some appropriate one-family residential areas of 
the community. These provisions are intended to meet community 
demands for residential accommodations for semitransient residents in 
areas of the community adjacent to major educational and institutional 
uses. This overlay zone is designed to provide an alternative living 
environment for said semi-transient residents to that normally found 
within the higher density multiple residential zones. The (S) overlay 
zone will therefore protect and enhance the desirable aesthetic 
characteristics of the underlying one-family residential zone. An Rl 
zone with a Supplementary Residential (S) Overlay as described in 
this Chapter is intended to continue the very low density of an Rl 
zone. The sole function of the overlay is to permit alternate methods 
of housing the occupancy otherwise permitted in an Rl zone. 
14.30.020. Use in Combination. 
(1) The Supplementary Residential (S) Overlay Zone may be 
used only in combination with the Rl (One-family Residential) Zone 
as designated herein. The provisions of the (S) Overlay Zone shall 
become supplementary to the provisions of the zone with which it is 
combined. The (S) Overlay Zone shall not be applied lo any land area 
as an independent zone. 
14.30.030. Permitted Uses. 
Uses permitted in the Supplementary Residential (S) Overlay 
Zone shall be limited to those uses listed as permitted uses in an Rl 
zone with the following additional permitted uses: 
(1) Accessory Apartment: For purposes of the Supplementary 
Residential Overlay Zone, a structure which is in all respects by design, 
construction, and appearance a one-family dwelling, qualifying as 
such within an Rl zone, may include an accessory apartment if the 
accessory apartment: 
(a) is located in a basement or in a second level above 
ground-level and there is a useable interior connection between 
the accessory apartment and the principal part of the dwelling 
unit; and, 
(b) does not alter the appearance of the structure as a one-
family dwelling, and does not cause the dwelling unit within 
which the accessory apartment is located to resemble in any 
degree a side-by-side, side-to-back, back-to-back, or other type 
of two-family dwelling; and 
(c) is a one-family dwelling having an accessor)' apartment 
under the provisions of this section shall have no more than two 
(2) kitchens within the dwelling. 
() Occupancy: 
(a) A one-family dwelling with an accessory apartment, 
which is authorized by and conforms to the requirements set 
forth in this section, shall be occupied, either in the accessory 
apartment or in the principal part of the dwelling unit, by 
(i) one (1) person living alone; or 
(ii) the head of household and all persons related to 
the head of household by marriage or adoption as a parent, 
child, grandparent, grandchild, brother, sister, uncle, aunt, 
nephew, niece, great-grandparent or great-grandchild. Two 
(2) or more of these persons shall share the legal relationship 
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of husband and wife, or parent and child or grandparent and -
child. Such parent or grandparent shall actually reside in 
the subject dwelling and the dwelling shall be the principal 
residence of any such person. 
(b) That part of the dwelling unit which is not occupied by 
the persons described in Subsection (2)(a) may be occupied by 
not more than four (4) related or unrelated persons. 
(c) Either the principal part of the dwelling unit or the 
accessory apartment shall be occupied by the owner of the 
dwelling. After owner occupancy has been duly established, 
such occupancy shall not be required when: 
(i) the owner has a bona fide, temporary absence of 
three (3) years or less for activities such as temporary job 
assignments, active military duty, sabbaticals, or voluntary 
service (indefinite periods of absence from the dwelling 
shall not qualify for this exception), or 
(ii) the owner is placed in a hospital, nursing home, 
assisted living facility or other similar facility. 
(iii) Owner occupancy shall have the meaning set 
forth in Section 14.06.020 of this Title. (Am 1998-55, Am 
2000-15, Am 2009-17, Am 2010-28) 
14.30.040. Development Standards. 
All development standards required in the Supplementary 
Residential (S) Overlay Zone shall be the same as those required 
by the provisions of the underlying zone with which the (S) zone is 
combined. 
14.30.050. Area of Zone. 
The Supplementary Residential (S) Overlay Zone shall be applied 
to a land area ten (10) acres or more which contains at least forty (40) 
existing dwelling structures, and which is at least fifty percent (50%) 
developed. The land area shall be free from islands or peninsulas or 
any other unreasonable boundary line configurations. Additions to an 
existing (S) Overlay Zone shall be by petition which conforms to all 
provisions of this Chapter except acreage, and number of dwellings. 
(Am 1991-07) ! 
14.30.060. Petition for Zone Adoption. 
Rep 2007-32 
14.30.070. Parking Requirements. 
Parking requirements for the Supplementary Residential (S) 
Overlay Zone shall be as required by the provisions of Section 
14.37.090, Provo City Code, except that any single dwelling with an 
occupied accessory dwelling shall have at least two (2) additional off-
street parking spaces, for a total of four (4) spaces. In no case shall 
the number of off-street parking spaces be less than the number of 
vehicles being maintained on the premises. If the owner wishes to rent 
to more unrelated individuals than there are supplementary parking 
spaces, this shall only be allowed under the following conditions: 
(1) Owners shall take the initiative in enforcing compliance 
by tenants with the limitations imposed herein upon the number of 
vehicles allowed their tenants and if a tenant fails to comply with such 
limitations after appropriate notice, owners shall forthwith evict such 
tenant; 
(2) Owners shall maintain a list of all tenants, together with the 
make and license plate number of their respective vehicles, which 
owners shall provide to Provo City upon request; 
(3) Owners shall enter into a covenant with Provo City that they 
will not rent to tenants having a total number of vehicles in excess of 
the total number of supplementary parking spaces (over and above the 
two (2) spaces required for the resident family) provided by owners, 
without the prior written consent of Provo City, which covenant shall 
be binding on all subsequent owners of the subject apartments. (Am 
1990-31) 
14.30.080. Nonconforming Uses. 
(1) After April 4, 2000, except as provided in subparagraph (2) 
of this Section, every dwelling unit in the (S) Overlay zone shall 
conform to the requirements of this Chapter. 
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of Chapter 14.36 of this Title, 
a one-family dwelling with an accessory dwelling unit which on April 
4, 2000 is not owner occupied and which was legally established 
shall not be required to conform to the owner occupancy and other 
development standards of this Chapter until April 4,2003. An owner 
of property affected by this Subsection may apply for an extension 
of time to comply with such occupancy and development standards 
subject to the provisions of Section 14.30.090 of this Chapter. (Am 
2000-15) 
14.30.090. Termination of Nonconforming Uses - Recovery of 
Investment. 
(1) The Community Development Director or his designee shall 
grant an owner of property affected by Subsection 14.30.080(2) of 
this Chapter an extension of the time required to conform with such 
Section if: 
(a) the owner: 
(i) by August 4, 2000 files a notice of intent to appjy 
for a time extension as provided in this Section; and 
(ii) by April 4, 2001 files a complete application for an 
extension of time as provided in this Section. 
(b) the owner's application for an extension of time 
demonstrates by a preponderance of evidence that: 
(i) the nonconforming use which is the subject of the 
application was legally established; and 
(ii) subject to the formula in Subsection (2) of this 
Section, the owner is unable to recover prior to April 4, 
2003 the amount of the owner's investment in the property. 
(2) (a) The time period during which an owner may recover 
the amount of his investment in property affected by Section 
14.30.080(2) of this Chapter shall be determined by dividing the 
residual value of the property by the average monthly net rental 
income from the property. The resulting figure is the number of 
months which the owner shall have to recover his investment in 
the property. 
(b) For the purposes of this Subsection the following 
definitions shall apply: 
"Amount of the owner's investment" means the adjusted 
present value of a property as of April 4, 2000. 
"Adjusted present value" means a property's original 
purchase price plus any capital improvements and less 
depreciation and net income from the property, all as adjusted 
for inflation to April 4, 2000. 
"Compliance value" means the appraised value of 
the property on April 4, 2000 based on compliance with the 
requirements of this Chapter. 
"Residual value" means the difference between a 
property's adjusted present value and its compliance value as of 
April 4, 2000. 
(c)The time period determined under Subsection (a) of this 
Section shall apply to the property for which the owner made an 
application for extension and to the owner's successors, if any, 
until such time period has run. 
(3) Any person aggrieved by a decision of the Community 
Development Director or his designee applying this Section may 
appeal such decision to the Board of Adjustment as provided in 
Chapter 14.05 of this Title. 
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6.25.060. Disclosure to be Made in Good Faith. 
Each disclosure required by this Chapter and each act which 
may be performed in making the disclosure shall be done in good 
faith. For purposes of this Chapter, "good faith" means honesty in fact 
in the conduct of the transaction. (Enacted 2000-29, Am 2000-36) 
6.25.070. Waiver of Buyer's or Lessee's Right to Disclosure. 
The disclosures required under this Chapter may not be waived 
and any attempted waiver shall be void as against public policy. 
(Enacted 2000-29, Am 2000-36) 
6.25.080. Failure to Disclose-Damages. 
A buyer or lessee to whom zoning disclosure is not made as 
required by this Chapter and who closes a transaction included within 
the scope of Section 6.25.030(1) may bring a civil action for damages 
caused as a result thereof. (Enacted 2000-29, Am 2000-36) 
6.25.090. Limitation on Liability. 
(1) A statement made on a zoning disclosure or a zoning 
disclosure form does not constitute a warranty by the seller or lessor 
as to any condition of the property about which the seller or lessor has 
no actual knowledge. 
(2) A seller or lessor is not liable for any error, inaccuracy, or 
omission in a zoning disclosure or zoning disclosure form provided 
under this Chapter if the error, inaccuracy, or omission was based 
upon information that was: 
(a) not within the actual knowledge of the seller or lessor; 
or 
(b) provided by Provo City or another government entity. 
(3) Each zoning disclosure or zoning disclosure form is provided 
to sellers, buyers, lessors and lessees of property for the purposes set 
forth in Section 6.25.010 of this Chapter. Although a zoning disclosure 
form may be provided by Provo City, the buyer or lessee of property 
subject to the requirements of this Chapter is solely responsible for 
ascertaining conditions and circumstances applicable to the property. 
The City's officers and employees shall not be liable for any error, 
inaccuracy, or omission in a zoning disclosure form. (Enacted 2000-29, 
Am 2000-36) 
6.25.100. Duty of Agent. 
(1) Any person representing a seller or lessor of residential 
property has a duty to inform the seller or lessor of the obligation to 
disclose the zoning information as required by this Chapter. 
(2) A person who represents a seller or lessor of residential 
property as set forth in paragraph (1) of this Section and who performs 
the duties specified therein shall: 
(a) have no further duties under this Chapter; and 
(b) not be liable for a violation of the requirements of 
this Chapter by a seller or lessor of property subject to such 
requirements. (Enacted 2000-29, Am 2000-36) 
6.25.110. Enforcement. 
(1) The provisions of this Chapter may be enforced by 
administrative action pursuant to the provisions of Title 17, Provo 
City Code. 
(2) A civil action for damages or to abate or enjoin a violation 
of this Chapter may be brought by Provo City or by any aggrieved 
person. The prevailing party in a civil action shall be entitled to 
recover reasonable attorneys fees. 
(3) The remedies provided for in this section shall be cumulative 
and not exclusive. (Enacted 2000-29, Am 2000-36) 
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6.26.010. Definitions. 
Words and phrases contained herein which are defined in 
Chapters 6.01 or 6.02 of this Title, or Chapter 14.06 of Title 14, as 
amended, shall have the meanings set forth in such chapters. (Enacted 
2003-01) 
6.26.020. License Required. 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to keep, conduct, operate or 
maintain a rental dwelling or a short-term rental dwelling within the 
City without a business license for such dwelling. A person who owns 
multiple-rental dwellings or multiple buildings containing rental 
dwellings is not required to obtain more than one (1) business license 
for the operation and maintenance of those rental dwellings. 
(2) It is unlawful to maintain a short-term rental dwelling in any 
agricultural or residential zone. A short-term rental dwelling which is 
leased or rented more than one (i) time in any thirty (30) day period 
shall be prima facie evidence that the use of the building is a short-
term rental dwelling. 
(3) A business license for a rental dwelling or a short-term 
rental dwelling is not transferable between persons or structures. Any 
person holding such license shall give written notice within thirty 
(30) days to the business license official after having transferred or 
otherwise disposed of legal or equitable control of any rental dwelling 
licensed under this Chapter. Such notice of transferred interest shall 
be deemed a request to cancel an existing business license for such 
rental dwelling and shall include the name, address, and information 
regarding the person(s) succeeding to the ownership or control 
thereof. The new owner shall obtain a business license as required by 
this Chapter. 
(4) A business license shall not be required for a dwelling 
unit which is ordinarily owner-occupied but is temporarily rented 
because: 
(a) the owner is placed in a hospital, nursing home, assisted 
living facility or other similar facility, or 
(b) the owner has a bona fide, temporary absence of three 
(3) years or less for activities such as temporary job assignments, 
sabbaticals, or voluntary service. Indefinite periods of absence 
from the dwelling shall not qualify for this exception. 
(c) As used in this subsection owner occupancy means: 
(i) a natural person who possesses fifty (50) percent 
ownership or more in the dwelling and said dwelling is the 
primary residence of such person; or 
(ii) a family trust created for the primary purpose of 
estate planning by one (I) or more trustors who create the 
trust, place the dwelling in such trust, and whose primary 
residence is such dwelling. (Enacted 2003-01, Am 2006-14, 
Am 2008-17) 
6.26.030. License Application. 
Chanter 6.26. Rental Dwellings. 
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An application for a business license shall conform to the 
requirements of Section 6.01.060 of this Title and shall include the 
following additional information: 
(1) the address of each building containing rental dwellings 
which are owned, operated or maintained by the applicant; 
(2) the number of rental dwelling units in each building; 
(3) the occupancy status ofeaeh rental dwelling unit; 
(4) the number of parking spaces provided on the premises; 
(5) if the owner of the rental dwellings is not a Utah resident, 
the name, address, and both home and business telephone numbers of 
a legal representative and agent who resides in the Stale of Utah for 
service of process; 
(6) the name, address, and both home and business telephone 
numbers of a local agent who: 
(a) resides not more than twenty (20) miles from the rental 
dwelling(s), and 
(b) is authorized to manage the rental dwelling(s): 
(7) proof of liability insurance for the rental dwellings to be 
licensed; and 
(8) the signature of the owner of the rental dwelling(s): 
(a) certifying, to the best of the owner's knowledge or belief, 
that the use and occupancy of the rental dwelling(s) conforms to 
applicable ordinances, and 
(b) agreeing to comply with applicable ordinances. (Enacted 
2003-01, Am 2006-45) 
6.26.040 License Procedure. 
(1) A rental dwelling business license shall be issued pursuant 
to the requirements of Chapters 6.01 and 6.02 of this Title except as 
modiiied by this Chapter. 
(2) No business license shall be issued or renewed for a rental 
dwelling unless the owner: 
(a) if not a Utah resident, designates in writing a power of 
attorney, in the name of a resident agent, for: 
(i) receipt of service for notice of violation of the 
provisions of this Chapter or any other applicable code 
requirement, and 
(ii) service of process, acknowledged by such agent; 
(b) certifies, to the best of the owner's knowledge or belief, 
that the use and occupancy of the rental dwelling(s) conforms to 
applicable ordinances; and 
(c) agrees to comply with applicable ordinances. (Enacted 
2003-01, Am 2006-45) 
6.26.050. License Fee. 
(1) The fee for a rental dwelling business license shall be as on 
the Consolidated Fee Schedule adopted by the Municipal Council. 
(2) There shall be no fee reduction for the first year in which a 
person engages in the business of operating, keeping, conducting, or 
maintaining a rental dwelling. 
(3) The business license fee shall be paid in advance for one (1) 
year and shall be due and payable on August 1 ofeaeh year. A license 
shall be delinquent if not paid before August 31 of the year for which 
it is due. (Enacted 2003-01, Am 2003-36, Am 2006-15, Am 2006-45) 
6.26.060. Effect of License Issuance. 
The issuance of a rental dwelling business license shall not have 
the effect of changing the legal status of a rental dwelling, including, 
but not limited to: 
(1) legalizing an illegally created dwelling unit, use, or other 
circumstance, or 
(2) recognizing a nonconforming use. structure, or other 
nonconformity. (Enacted 2003-01) 
An application for a rental dwelling business license may be 
denied for any of the following reasons: 
(l)The applicant does not meet the qualifications for a license as 
provided in this Title. 
(2) For a new application, nonpayment and return of a check for 
the required license fee. For a renewal application, nonpayment of the 
required license fee plus any penalty assessed for late payment. 
(3) A reviewing City department recommends disapproval of 
the application pursuant to an applicable provision of the Provo City 
Code. 
(4) An application contains false or incomplete information. 
(5) The rental dwelling does not comply with applicable Health 
Department regulations governing the premises, or any City, State or 
federal law. (Enacted 2003-01) 
6.26.080. License Suspension or Revocation. 
The City may suspend or revoke a rental dwelling business 
license for any of the reasons set forth in Section 6.01.160 of this 
Title and for any of the following reasons: 
(1) the licensee does not meet the qualifications for a license as 
provided under this Title: 
(2) the licensee gave false or incomplete information on the 
licensee's application; 
(3) the licensee has allowed the licensed premises to be occupied 
or operated in a manner contrary to the conditions set forth in the 
license; or 
(4) the licensee's agents or employees have violated the 
provisions of the license, this Title or any other law while acting as an 
agent or employee of the licensee. (Enacted 2003-01) 
6.26.090. Determination of Legal Status. 
(1) The provisions of this subsection shall be applied to determine 
whether a particular rental dwelling was legally established and is 
thus qualified, subject to the provisions of this Chapter, for a rental 
dwelling business license. 
(2) If necessary building and zoning permits were issued 
authorizing the establishment of a rental dwelling, construction was 
substantially completed pursuant to such permits, and no deviation 
therefrom has occurred thereafter, the issuance of such permits shall be 
prima facie evidence that the rental dwelling was legally established. 
A business license for such rental dwelling may be issued, subject to 
the provisions of this Chapter. 
(3) If necessary building permits were not issued authorizing 
a rental dwelling, or if allegations are made that necessary permits 
were issued, but no record of any such permits can be found, a 
determination of the legal status of the rental dwelling shall be made 
pursuant to subsections (a), (b), and (c) below. 
(a) A determination shall be made as to whether the rental 
dwelling substantially conforms to applicable zoning and 
building code requirements in effect when the rental dwelling was 
established. If necessary to make such determination, the Zoning 
Administrator, Chief Building Official or their designees may 
inspect the rental dwelling premises, pursuant to authorization 
from the owner of the rental dwelling. 
(i) If the rental dwelling conforms to requirements 
of the currently applicable zone, as set forth in Title 14, 
Provo City Code, then the rental dwelling shall be deemed 
legally established so long as substantial evidence exists to 
conclude the rental dwelling met building code standards in 
effect when the dwelling unit was created and no deviations 
therefrom have occurred, other than deviations required by 
applicable law. 
(ii) If the rental dwelling does not conform to 
requirements of the currently applicable zone, and did not 
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the rental dwelling was created, then the rental dwelling 
shall be deemed illegal and no rental dwelling business 
license shall be issued. 
(iii) If the rental dwelling substantially conforms 
to zoning and building code requirements that applied 
when the rental dwelling was created, or conforms to 
requirements of a zoning status determination which may 
have been previously made by the City, and no deviations 
therefrom have occurred, other than deviations required by 
applicable law. then the rental dwelling shall be deemed 
legally established. 
(iv) If the rental dwelling does not substantially conform 
to zoning and building code requirements that applied 
when the rental dwelling was created, a rental dwelling 
business license may be issued if the illegal aspects of the 
structure are abated, mitigated, or brought into compliance 
with applicable zoning and building code requirements in 
effect when the rental dwelling was established, except as 
otherwise provided in Section 6.26.100 of this Chapter; 
and provided the dwelling units in the rental dwelling have 
regularly been occupied in a manner that would have been 
allowed when the rental dwelling was established. The 
fact that a particular number of dwelling units could have 
been established under prior applicable zoning shall not be 
used as a basis for authorizing a greater number of dwelling 
units than the number of units which have been regularly 
occupied as such in a rental dwelling. 
(b) The presence of an interior connection between upper, 
lower, or adjoining portions of a structure originally constructed 
as a single family dwelling shall create a presumption that only 
one (I) dwelling unit was originally authorized, unless the 
connection was obviously originally constructed as a vestibule, 
lobby, or passage way between dwelling units in the structure. 
Such presumption may be rebutted by a preponderance of 
evidence that the rental dwelling was legally established. 
(c) Rental dwellings located within a complex consisting of 
one (I) or more multiple-family dwellings or apartment buildings 
constructed prior to January l, 1974, and located in a zone where 
such dwellings and buildings, as presently existing, are not 
permitted under Title 14, Provo City Code, shall be entitled to a 
rental dwelling business license so long as the requirements of 
this Chapter are met, and such dwellings and apartments in the 
complex: 
(i) were originally constructed substantially as 
presently existing; 
(ii) were not originally constructed and occupied 
as single-family dwellings and later converted to 
multiple- family or apartment dwellings, except as 
permitted by a building permit; 
(iii) are all owned by the same individual, 
association, firm, partnership, or other legal entity; 
and 
(iv) are managed by a property manager, or 
management company in Provo City. 
(4) (a) A person: 
(i) who owns a dwelling originally constructed as 
a one-family dwelling which existed prior to August 
1,2003, and 
(ii) who has not. applied for or obtained a rental 
dwelling license for such dwelling under the provisions 
of this Chapter by December 31, 2007; 
(b) shall not be entitled to thereafter obtain a rental 
dwelling license for more than one (I) rental dwelling unit in 
such dwelling unless: 
(i) a greater number of dwelling units is permitted 
by the zone where the dwelling is located, 
(ii) a building permit has been issued authorizing 
the dwelling units, and 
(iii) applicable provisions of this Title are met. 
(Enacted 2003-01, Am 2003-36, Am 2007-29) 
6.26.100. Minimum Health and Safety Requirements. 
After the effective date of this Chapter, and notwithstanding 
that a rental dwelling qualifies for a business license under Section 
6.26.090 of this Chapter, each rental dwelling shall meet the building 
code requirements necessary to achieve, or be mitigated to the 
satisfaction of the Chief Building Official to achieve: 
(1) structural integrity; 
(2) proper installation, maintenance and operational condition of 
all plumbing, electrical, and mechanical systems; 
(3) appropriate exiting; 
(4) properly constructed and located stairways, including 
consistent rise and run of stair treads; 
(5) appropriate bedroom egress windows, including proper sill 
height and size of window openings and vvindow wells for basement 
rooms; 
(6) minimum bedroom floor area; 
(7) adequate guardrails; 
(8) proper backflow prevention devices; 
(9) appropriately located and operational smoke alarms; 
(10) watertight and sound roofing systems; 
(11) fire-rated separation between dwelling units: and 
(12) properly placed street addressing. (Enacted 2003-0L Am 2003-
6.26.110. Minimum Parking Requirements. 
After the effective date of this Section, parking for a rental 
dwelling shall conform to the following parking requirements: 
(1) Parking and driveway areas for a rental dwelling shall be 
paved entirely with asphaltic cement or concrete and maintained in 
good condition. 
(a) Paving shall be maintained so as to eliminate dust or 
mud, and shall be sealed, resurfaced, graded and drained to 
dispose of all surface water. Surface water drainage shall not 
cross a public sidewalk. 
(b) The width of an nonconforming driveway existing prior 
to August 17, 2004 may continue subject to the standards in 
effect when the driveway was created. In no case, however, shall 
the paved width of a driveway be less than eight and one-half 
(8/2) feet. 
(c) The requirements of this Subsection (I) shall not apply 
to a detached one-family rental dwelling. Provided, however, 
that any legally existing on-site parking for such a dwelling shall 
be maintained in good condition. 
(2) The size of each parking space shall be: 
(a) eight and one-half (8/4) feet by eighteen (18) feet, or 
(b) if smaller than eight and one-half (8/2) feet by eighteen 
(18) feet, the size required when the parking space was created. 
Provided, however, that a parking space subject to this Subsection 
shall always be at least seven and one-half (7/2) feet by fifteen 
(15) feet. * 
(3) Pavement thickness for a parking space shall be as follows: 
(a) Asphalt: minimum of two (2) inches of asphalt and six 
(6) inches of road base. 
(b) Concrete: minimum of four (4) inches. 
(4) Each rental dwelling shall have on-site parking spaces which 
equal the greater of: 
(a) The number of parking spaces required by applicable 
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(b) the number of legal parking spaces existing on August 
17, 2004, or 
(c) the number of parking spaces required to provide a 
parking space for every motor vehicle used by occupants of the 
rental dwelling. Vehicles owned or operated from such premises 
shall not exceed the number of legal off-street parking spaces 
required to provide a parking space for every motor vehicle used 
by occupants of a rental dwelling. 
(5) Parking areas containing five (5) or more spaces shall be 
striped to clearly demarcate required parking spaces. Striping shall be 
at least three (3) inches wide and shall consist of white or yellow paint 
designed for this purpose. 
(6) No off-street parking shall be permitted in a required front 
yard or street side yard except as follows: 
(a) Tandem parking spaces for a one-family dwelling or a 
two-family dwelling may be located on a driveway in a required 
front or side yard provided such driveway leads to the minimum 
number of required covered off-street parking spaces which are 
located behind any required front or side yard setback. 
(b) Nonconforming parking that has been established for 
front yard, side yard, or tandem parking not leading to covered 
parking, if permitted by applicable codes in effect when the rental 
dwelling was created, shall be permitted, A public sidewalk shall 
not be used for any portion of a parking space. 
(7) An existing carport or garage may continue to serve as 
required off-street parking subject to the standards in effect when the 
carport or garage was created, provided that the interior dimensions 
of a garage or carport shall in no case be less than nine (9) feet wide 
and fifteen (15) feet deep. 
(8) Off-street parking for a rental dwelling shall be located on 
the same lot as the dwelling which it is required to serve. Required 
parking for multiple residential developments shall not be rented, 
leased or otherwise utilized by another dwelling unit or development 
with the intent of increasing the occupancy of a dwelling unit. 
(9) In the case of mixed uses in a building or on a lot (commercial 
and residential uses), the total requirement for off-street parking 
spaces shall be the sum of the parking required for each use present in 
the building or on the lot. 
(10) No parking lot as required by this Section shall be constructed 
or maintained or allowed within one hundred (100) feet of the closest 
bank of the Provo River at any location where the adjacent property 
to the river is part of the flood plain. 
(11) Plans for proposed changes or additions to parking 
existing as of the effective date of this Section shall be submitted 
to the Community Development Department and approved prior to 
paving. Such plans shall be drawn to a recognized scale indicating the 
proposed parking including location, size, shape, design, curb cuts 
and shall show all structures located on the property. (Enacted 2003-01, 
Am 2003-36, Am 2004-21, Am 2004-32, Am 2006-14) 
6.26.120. Inspections. 
Inspections of rental dwellings may be conducted as provided in 
Section 6.01.070, Provo City Code. (Enacted 2003-01) 
6.26.130, Effective Date. 
The provisions of this Chapter shall take effect on August 1, 
2003, after which no rental dwelling shall be rented, loaned, leased, 
or hired out for a period of one (1) month or longer without a valid 
business license. (Enacted 2003-01) 
6.26.140. Compliance Reports. 
(1) Within ten (10) days of the beginning of each calendar quarter 
the Mayor shall provide to the Municipal Council a rental dwelling 
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(i) issued and have not expired or been revoked; 
(ii) applied for but not issued; and 
(iii) applied for and not issued which have been 
pending for more than six (6) months; and; 
(b) the number of rental dwelling units authorized under all 
presently valid licenses. 
(2) In conjunction with the report required under Subsection 
(1) of this section, the Mayor shall provide a report to the Municipal 
Council which details the reasons why any license pending for more 
than one (1) year has not been issued. (Enacted 2007-29) 
Chapter 6.27. Ticket Scalping. 
6.27.010. Unlawful Ticket Sales. 
6.27.020. No Criminal Liability for Authorized Ticket Sales. 
6.27.030. Criminal Liability. 
6.27.010. Unlawful Ticket Sales. 
It shall be unlawful for any person to resell or offer for resale 
any ticket of admission or other evidence of the right of entry to any 
athletic contest, concert, theater performance, amusement, exhibition, 
or other entertainment event to which the general public is admitted 
within seven hundred fifty (750) feet of a ticket office tor such 
a contest or event, or a public entrance to such a contest or event. 
(Enacted 2002-47, Ren 2003-04) 
6.27.020. No Criminal Liability for Authorized Ticket Sales. 
No provision of this Chapter shall criminally prohibit the 
purchaser for personal use of one (1) or more tickets to an athletic 
contest or entertainment event from reselling or offering for resale 
any of such tickets in any zone or zones within a restricted area, when 
such activity is authorized by the sponsor of the contest or event and 
the owner or operator of the venue where such contest or event is 
being held or to be held. (Enacted 2002-47, Ren 2003-04) 
6.27.030. Criminal Liability. 
Violation of this chapter shall be punishable by a minimum fine 
of one hundred dollars ($100.00) for a first offense, a minimum fine 
of two hundred fifty dollars ($250.00) for a second offense, and a 
minimum fine of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) for a third or any 
subsequent offense. (Enacted 2002-47, Ren 2003-04) 
Chapter 6.28. Newsracks. 
6.28.010. Title. 
6.28.020. Definitions. 
6.28.030. Noticing of Ordinance. 
6.28.040. Newsrack Locations. 
6.28.050. Yearly Permit or Certification. 
6.28.060. Permit Application. 
6.28.070. Permit Fee. 
6.28.080. Permit Issuance. 
6.28.090. Publication Priority. 
6.28.100. Certification Application. 
6.28.110. Certificate Fee. 
6.28.120. Hold Harmless. 
6.28.130. Insurance Requirements. 
6.28.140. Design Standards. 
6.28.150. Initial Installation Procedure. 
6.28.160. Identification. 
6.28.170. Maintenance and Installation Standards. 
6.28.180. Location Restrictions. 
6.28.190. Limitation of Rights Granted. 
6.28.200. Non-Emergency Removal-Distributors. 
6.28.210. Emergency Removal-Distributors. 
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